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Abstract 
Nowadays, the high costs that the Portuguese State is bearing with Public-Private Partnerships 
(PPPs) are often in the headlines of the Portuguese newspapers. In this context, the purpose of 
this dissertation is to analyse the predicted costs with PPPs projects for the public partner in the 
road sector. Since, over the last years, the National State Budgets has presented different 
predictions regarding the cost that the State will bear during 2014-2031.  
Therefore, I had as objective to assess if there are reasons that explain those differences.  To 
accomplish this objective, I investigated each project and each State Budget. Through this data 
analysis, I verified that during the period that was studied (from the State Budget of 2005 to 
2014), new projects with expected costs for the public partner were launched, and there were 
renegotiations of the contracts. Thus, these are some of the reasons for the differences observed. 
Then, I identified factors that affect the predicted costs through econometric analysis. The 
model has as dependent variable the Present Value of the predicted costs for each project in 
each State Budget, and I concluded that they are affected by the changes on the model of 
payment, by the economic context and by the fact that Portugal was in the last years under a 
Financial Assistance Programme. Moreover, with this dissertation, I identified some challenges 
for the public partner with the PPP model. One of the main aspects that has to be improved is 
the transparency. The State Budgets should disclose more information and mainly explain 




Nos dias de hoje, os elevados custos suportados pelo Estado com Parcerias Público-Privadas 
(PPPs) são muitas vezes manchetes dos jornais portugueses. Neste contexto, o objetivo desta 
dissertação é analisar os custos previstos com PPPs do sector rodoviário para o parceiro público. 
Uma vez que, ao longo dos últimos anos, os Orçamentos de Estado apresentaram diferentes 
previsões em relação aos custos que o Estado terá que suportar durante 2014-2031. 
Assim sendo, pretendi encontrar explicações para essas diferenças. De forma a concretizar esse 
objetivo, analisei cada projecto e cada Orçamento de Estado (OE). Com esta análise de dados, 
verifiquei que durante o período analisado (do OE de 2005 ao de 2014), novos projectos com 
custos esperados para o parceiro público foram lançados, e que houve renegociações de 
contractos. Assim, estas são algumas das razões para as diferenças observadas. Depois 
identifiquei fatores que afetam os custos previstos via análise econométrica. O modelo tem 
como variável dependente o Valor Actualizado dos custos previstos para cada projecto em cada 
OE, e concluí que são afectados pelas mudanças do modelo de pagamento, pelo contexto 
económico e pelo facto de Portugal ter estado nos últimos anos ao abrigo de um Programa de 
Assistência Financeira. Com esta dissertação identifiquei alguns desafios para o parceiro 
público com o modelo de PPP. Um dos principais aspectos a melhorar é a transparência. Os 
Orçamentos de Estado devem divulgar mais informação e, principalmente, explicar os desvios 
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Over the last years, in Portugal, there has been a considerable debate in the media and at a 
political level regarding Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). The costs supported by the State1 
are considered too high and unaffordable. Therefore, it is important to understand if they were 
expected in the State Budgets (SBs). By observing the predicted costs presented in different 
State Budgets for the same period of time and for the road sector, I verified that those 
predictions vary from one SB to another. For example, the figure 1 presents the predicted costs 
for the State with PPPs in the road sector from 2014 to 2031 in two different State Budgets, the 
SB 2006 and 2009. Thus, if I am analysing the costs for the same period of time, I would expect 
that those lines overlap, in other words, the predictions should be equal. In fact, the evolution of 




Figure 1: Predicted costs during 2014-2031 
X-axis: Years 







                                                     




Other approach in observing these differences is by summing the discounted predicted costs per 





Y-axis: PV of predicted costs for the State (M€) 
 
Observing this graph I could also verify the differences from one SB to another. For example, 
comparing the present value (PV) of the predicted costs presented in the SB of 2006 and of 
2009, there is a difference of 6 170 M€2. Why are they different?  
In this context the main objective of this dissertation is to find the explanations behind the 
predictions presented in the Portuguese State Budgets regarding the cost that the State will bear 
during 2014-2031. Thus, I will aim at answering the questions: How can one explain different 
predictions regarding how much the State will spend during the same period of time? Which 
factors can affect the predictions?  
One of the explanations may be related to the launch of new projects. If there is a new project, 
this may increase costs. Other reason would be renegotiations. There are examples of PPPs that 
were renegotiated, and this had a significant impact on the financial responsibilities of the State. 
Moreover, the economic and political situation during the preparation of each SB may also 
affect the predictions. These possible reasons are further on analysed in this dissertation.  
In order to answer the main question of this dissertation, I will firstly analyse each PPP in the 
road sector (24 projects) and each State Budgets (10 SBs, from the SB 2005 to 2014). This way, 
I will be able to recognize the main events regarding PPPs in the road sector. Then, I will 
compute an econometric model based on panel data, on which I will identify the variables that 
affect the predictions. Since State Budgets only present the total predicted costs for the road 
sector, this analysis will be based on data on costs per project, provided by Estradas de Portugal. 
                                                     
2 The PV of the predicted costs in the State Budget of 2009 is 9 487 M€, and of 2006 is 3 317 M€. (In the section Methodology and 
Data Collection it is explained how these values were computed). 




2. Literature Review 
2.1. Overall overview of concepts 
PPPs refer to a model applied by governments to finance public investment. Actually, there is 
not a single definition for this type of model. As defined by the OECD, they are “an agreement 
between the government and one or more private partners (which may include the operators and 
the financers) according to which the private partners deliver the service in such manner that the 
service delivery objectives of the government are aligned with the profit objectives of the 
private partners and where the effectiveness of the alignment depends on a sufficient transfer of 
risk to the private partners” (OECD, 2008). Since Portugal is the case study of this dissertation, 
the definition of PPP by the Portuguese Law is the following: “a contract by which private 
entities undertake, for a long period, the responsibility of ensuring the development of an 
activity aimed at satisfying a collective need. The financing, the investment and the operation of 
the project are responsibilities, in whole or in part, of the private partner” (Decree-Law n. 86/ 
2003 of 26th of April3). Summarizing, all definitions of PPPs refer to them as a public-private 
relationship, based on a contract and on risk sharing in a more complex way than traditional 
infrastructure public procurement (TIP)4.  
Actually, a PPP is a model of delivering public services that is being increasingly used in 
several countries in order to face current main challenges. For instance, in developing countries, 
needs regarding infrastructure and services have not been satisfied, and this has compromised 
the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. On the other hand, developed countries 
have to face the growing demand for more infrastructures, the need to improve public services 
and the need to upgrade public infrastructure due to the ageing of assets (OECD, 2007). So, 
what is the solution? Governments could invest heavily in infrastructure and service delivery. 
However, there are budget constraints to bear in mind which cannot be ignored. To recap the 
first lesson in economics, there are limited resources and unlimited needs: all governments must 
still find the financial means to supply public infrastructure. Furthermore, some countries deal 
with fiscal pressures concerning the reduction of public debt and fiscal deficits (OECD, 2007 
                                                     
3 A few remarks on this Decree-Law: 
 Translated by the author from the original Portuguese version: 
“Contracto ou a união de contractos, por via dos quais entidades privadas, designadas por parceiros privados, se 
obrigam, de forma duradoura, perante um parceiro público, a assegurar o desenvolvimento de uma actividade tendente 
à satisfação de uma necessidade colectiva, e em que o financiamento e a responsabilidade pelo investimento e pela 
exploração incumbem, no todo ou em parte, ao parceiro privado” 
 This Decree-Law was the first legal regulation regarding PPPs in Portugal, and established the characteristics and rules 
concerning the launch of PPPs. It is worth to mention that the majority of the contracts were signed before the 
publication of it. Therefore, the PPP’s boom in Portugal was without a specific legal framework (Moreno, 2010). 
4 Traditional Infrastructure Procurement:  governments pay to private companies for the construction of certain infrastructures. In 
the end of the construction’s period, the asset belongs to the government, and it is responsible for its operation (OECD, 2013). In 
Appendix 1, the differences between the contracting and financing structure of a TIP and a PPP concession, are presented.  
PPPs: “arrangements where the private sector supplies infrastructures assets and infrastructure-based services that traditionally have 





and 2008; Posner, Ryu et Tkachenko, 2009). PPPs, as an alternative to TIP, have proven5 to be a 
good choice when governments deal with a strict financial constraint and the service delivery 
role6. In these situations, the financing from the private sector, sometimes, seems the cheapest or 
even the only way to finance a project. In extreme situations, governments only have two 
options: apply the PPP model or “no infrastructure” (OECD, 2007). In fact, “when national 
budgets are on bread-and-water diets, PPPs are like a parcel of cheese and sausage under the 
floorboards”7. Some governments only apply the PPP model when they have neither revenues 
nor the credit to finance investments in public goods and services8. On one hand, this is a reason 
for the increasing use of PPPs. But, on the other hand, it is one of the biggest problems. 
Summarily, the reason for applying PPPs should not be the demand for financial miracle 
solutions or financial engineering to launch projects. Contrarily, it should be a feasible solution 
among other alternatives, and should only be applied when its advantages for the public sector 
are proven by a cost-benefit analysis (Cardoso, 2011; Arroja, 2012).  
Apart from that, there are other reasons for using PPPs, which provide potential9 benefits for the 
economy. For instance, the share of know-how and resources between the private and public 
sector, which may lead to a more effective, efficient10, flexible and faster way of maximizing 
collective satisfaction. The differences between these two types of partners may lead to a 
healthy marriage (Dochia et Parker, 2009; Posner, Ryu et Tkachenko, 2009; Cardoso, 2011; 
OPPP, 2011). Actually, the benefits obtained from the technical and specialized capacities in 
construction and management of services of private partners comes as one of the main potential 
advantages. These benefits encompass the improvement of supplied goods and services and/or 
the possibility of creating savings of public resources, which provides greater fiscal margin11  
(Grimsey et Lewis, 2004; OECD, 2007 and 2008; Posner, Ryu et Tkachenko, 2009; Cardoso, 
2011). In addition to this, in comparison to a TIP, a PPP may provide more incentives for the 
private sector to deliver a better job. With the TIP model, the private sector is involved only in 
the construction, and afterwards, the public sector is solely responsible for the maintenance. 
                                                     
5 At least, according to some members of governments, and at idealistic terms. However, as it will be explained in this dissertation, 
this model of financing was not always a good idea. In some cases, they have proven not to be a good idea, or, a good idea that was 
not well implemented. 
6 According to the information in the SB 2006, the Portuguese Government was interested in increasing the number of projects with 
high levels of investment using the PPP model, in order to deal with the public financial situation at the time (SB, 2006).  
7 Source: OECD Observer No 278 (2010) 
8 Public good: there are some goods and services that do not create profits, so they will never be offered by the private sector. In 
fact, the objective of this sector is the maximization of profits. However, these good and services create positive externalities for the 
economy as a whole. These are two reasons why they have to be offered by the State (Arroja, 2012; Sarmento, 2013).  
9 Some assumptions must be verified for a PPP to prove its real advantages (Cardoso, 2011). 
10 A few remarks on Effectiveness and Efficiency: 
 Effectiveness: the intended quantity is delivered (OECD, 2008). 
 Efficiency: It is delivered at least cost (OECD, 2008).  
 “The involvement of private operators has its main advantage over publicly run projects when there is a potential to take 
advantage of the private operators’ operational and administrative efficiencies (such as the technical expertise and the 
managerial competences of commercial operators), increased competition and enhanced services to end-consumers” 
(OECD, 2007). For example, efficiency can be improved because of the ability of the private partner to impose user 
charges, which may be not easy for the government. Moreover, the private partner may easier align the price with costs. 
In this way, inefficient demands are reduced (Schwartz, Corbacho et Funke, 2008 and Posner, Ryu et Tkachenko 2009). 
11 “The purpose of this collaboration is to bring added value to infrastructure through innovation, enabling the government to deliver 




Therefore, the private sector partner may purposely fail to perform in accordance with the 
desirable quality and without delays, because this may imply more profits. By not delivering a 
good job, the infrastructure may need an improvement in the future, which can lead to an 
additional contract with the same private entity. The other possible situation is if the State 
decides to cut in maintenance costs. In fact, this is usually the case in periods of austerity. 
Therefore, the operation of the infrastructure is not improved. Contrarily, with a PPP, the 
private sector starts receiving payments only when the operational stage starts, so it is not 
interested in delays during the construction period. Additionally, it would want to avoid high 
lifecycle costs (future O&M cost), which justifies a focus on higher quality12. In conclusion, to 
pursuit this objective, the private partner “boosts both the coverage and efficiency of 
infrastructure services” (OECD, 2007) and it may invest in cost-saving technology. Thus, it may 
have incentives to incur in higher costs initially, in order to reduce future costs13 (Posner, Ryu et 
Tkachenko, 2009; Burger et Hawkesworth, 2011; Cardoso, 2011). Other advantage of the PPP 
model is that it reduces the domain of the governmental action. In other words, with these 
projects, the State is not responsible for all the proceedings, such as planning, financing, 
construction, management and maintenance. Thus, the risks associated with all these stages are 
not fully borne by the State. In other words, there is risk sharing. Summarily, the main 
advantages for the public partner would be the risk sharing, the possible high value for money, 
if the private partner has more skills, and consequently, if it can face the additional financing 
costs of private interest rates (Schwartz, Corbacho et Funke, 2008; Posner, Ryu et Tkachenko, 
2009; Cardoso, 2011). For the private partner, an advantage of the PPP model is the opportunity 
of new businesses. It is the possibility of working in areas that previously were only of the 
governments’ responsibility; and, at the same time, obtaining high remunerations (Schwartz, 
Corbacho et Funke, 2008; Moreno, 2010).  
However, aligning public and private interests is not always possible, since sometimes there are 
goal conflicts. It is easier to deal with this, if the infrastructure leads to more productivity for the 
private partner. Contrarily, “the more a service takes on the character of a public good, the less 
private incentives will be congruent with public interest, leading to greater public 
disappointment with the results” (Posner, Ryu et Tkachenko, 2009). Generally, their different 
interests lead to uncertain relations, “characterized as bargaining relationships in which both 
partners have independent sources of leverage over the other”, which therefore, may affect the 
                                                     
12 Examples: “PPPs, in fact, have shown some early gains in construction timeliness and costs. The United Kingdom National Audit 
Office reports that PPPs are delivered on time and on budget more often than traditional arrangements. Traditional infrastructure is 
on time and on budget 30% of the time, while PPP projects are on time and on budget over 75% of the time (Hodge and Greve, 
2007, p. 549). Michael Pollitt also concluded that PPPs deliver on time and on budget a higher percentage of the time. While public 
agencies could do this too, they needed PPPs to stimulate and innovate (Pollitt, 2005). Beyond this, some studies have shown that 
PPPs were less costly in the United Kingdom for prisons and roads. The National Audit Office predicted that a sample of projects 
studied in the 1990s experienced cost savings of 10%, attributable to risk transfers from public to private firms (Hodge and Greve, 
2007)” (Posner, Ryu et Tkachenko, 2009). 





achievement of public goals (Posner, Ryu et Tkachenko, 2009). In fact, PPPs, unfortunately, are 
not regarded as a bed of roses. Most of the problems that arise are related with the costs with 
PPPs for the State: they may encumber more SBs. In fact, there are different problematic 
situations in different countries. That is why some international institutions have already 
published recommendations14 regarding transparency, affordability, accountability, risk sharing, 
etc. of PPP’s projects. These are core areas to which some of those problems are related to. In 
section 2.2, the problems related to these areas, which directly or indirectly affect the costs for 
the State, are deeply analysed.  
2.2. Challenges regarding PPPs 
2.2.1. The Role of the State 
As aforementioned, a PPP has an inherent complex relation, which involves two distinct entities 
in a contract during a long period. These entities have different objectives and interests, and 
historically, they are not compatible (for example, maximization of profits vs social interest) 
(Bult-Spiering et Dewulf, 2006; OECD, 2008; Cardoso, 2011; OPPP, 2011). Therefore, 
cooperation is crucial. In this context, the word partnership does not mean that the involved 
parties share the same objectives. It means that, although their objectives are different, they are 
able to align them in order to achieve the objectives of both partners (OECD, 2008). In addition 
to this, the State cannot forget its responsibilities. Although some work is transferred to the 
private partner, the Government is still responsible for the performance of the project (Posner, 
Ryu et Tkachenko, 2009).  
In order to deal with the problem of goal conflict and accomplish with its main responsibility of 
acting in favour of the public interest, the public partner should have “a competent, equitable 
and diligent attention to contracts, regulation and legal frameworks” (OECD, 2007). In fact, 
regarding competence, there are examples of situations that prove that the public partner is not 
prepared to deal with PPPs (OECD, 2007). In Portugal, for instance, it is mentioned that the 
State has a deficit of capacity to monitor, supervise, control and follow the contract of PPPs’ 
projects (Tribunal de Contas, 2003; Assembleia da República, 2013). Therefore, the 
Government needs to develop and/ or improve its skills to be able to deal/negotiate with the 
private partner, who is considered to have better competencies (OECD, 2007)15. That is why the 
National Audit Office (NAO) in 2013 emphasized the need to have specialized personnel and 
sufficient number of people to monitor a pari passu all projects in all its aspects (cited by 
                                                     
14 One example is the book “Recommendation of the Council on Principles for Public Governance of Public-Private Partnerships” 
(OECD, 2012) 
15 Although, “a PPP is a better option if the government does not itself possess the requisite skills to construct and operate the 
project”, when it chooses the PPP model, “it will nevertheless need skilled staff to monitor the private partner and to manage its own 
responsibilities and risk” (Burger et Hawkesworth, 2011). Therefore, “authorities need to build the necessary competencies to act as 
an equal partner to the private sector participants” (OECD, 2007). As Sarmento said, it is important to improve the capacities of the 




Assembleia da República, 2013). The costs associated with the development of competencies 
should be included in the design of the project (OECD, 2007). 
2.2.2. Risk 
Risk is “any factor, event or influence that threatens the successful completion of a project in 
terms of time, cost or quality” (European Commission, 2003). In the TIP model, risks are fully 
allocated to the public sector. Whereas, one of the characteristics of the PPP model is that some 
risks can be transferred to the private sector. When a certain event occurs, the entity, to whom 
the risk related to that event was allocated, has to bear the cost. In other words, if a certain risk 
is allocated to the public partner, it has a higher responsibility over that risk. On one hand, the 
public partner would want to transfer risks to the private partner, since its responsibility is 
reduced. On the other hand, the private partner charges a price for dealing with risks, and the 
price increases with the exposure to more risk. In addition to this, the price is also linked to the 
risk-aversion profile of the private partner. The higher the risk aversion of the private partner, or 
the lower its capability to deal with the risk, the higher the cost will be (Cardoso, 2011). 
Actually, risk has a direct impact on the financial cost of a PPP (European Commission. 2003). 
Therefore, the allocation of risks should be balanced. Actually, a good allocation may 
contribute to a better Value for Money (VfM), since the private partner has higher ability to deal 
with certain risks (European Commission, 2003; OECD, 2008; Cardoso, 2011). VfM is the 
difference between the costs for the State using TIP and using PPP, via the calculus of the 
Public Sector Comparator (PSC). Thus, it is linked to savings for the public partner that can be 
achieved by applying the PPP model (Cardoso, 2011). However, VfM does not only include 
quantitative, but also, qualitative aspects, such as, the government’s judgment regarding what 
the best combination of quality, features and price is. Summarily, it refers to the highest quality 
at the best price (OECD, 2008 and 2013). Therefore, it is an important element in verifying if a 
certain project should be financed by a PPP or not.  
However, as aforementioned, transferring a risk from the public to the private partner has a 
price premium, thus, it affects the cost for the public partner. In this context, it is important to 
allocate risk in a cost effective way. In conclusion, the best balance is to allocate each risk to the 
partner who has better capacity, more knowledge and experience to deal with it. For example, 
risks that concern operational efficiency usually should be assigned to the private partner, and 
risks related to the pursuing of non-commercial objectives should be allocated to the public 
partner16 (European Commission, 2003; Bult-Spiering et Dewulf, 2006; OECD, 2007).  
Moreover, risk-allocation is linked to renegotiations of PPP contracts and Financial Re-
equilibrium Agreements (FRAs) (characteristics of these contracts that are explained in a further 
                                                     
16 “The objectives of risk transfer include: to reduce long term cost of a project by allocating risk to the party best able to manage it 
in the most cost effective manner; to provide incentives to the contractor to deliver projects on time, to required standard and within 
the budget; to improve the quality of service and increase revenue through more efficient operations; and to provide a more 




section). The way that a risk is evaluated and therefore allocated has an impact regarding if 
there will be or not renegotiations (Cardoso, 2011). In fact, risk sharing is an important topic for 
this dissertation, since if the allocation is done correctly, it may reduce potential FRAs, and 
therefore avoid some extra costs for the State. Actually, when the public partner is selecting the 
best project during the tendering process, it should not choose based only on the financial costs. 
In fact, there are projects called optimistic/aggressive proposals. Initially, a project can present a 
lower cost, and thus win the tendering process. However, if risks are not well allocated, this can 
lead to FRAs, which consequently, will make the project more expensive for the public partner 
(Posner, Ryu et Tkachenko, 2009; Cardoso, 2011). This was one of the NAO’s critics, since in 
Portugal, the main criteria to evaluate proposals is based on assessing the NPVs of State’s costs. 
As a consequence, some private entities present projects with lower costs, simply in order to 
make it to the next stage. It is argued that this is an example of lack of equality, competition17 
and transparency (Tribunal de Contas, 2003; Assembleia da República, 2013).  
Moreover, the risk-allocation in Portugal is considered to be inefficient, due to a weak 
identification and allocation of risks. In fact, this was the cause of the failure of some PPP 
contracts. This weakness had as a consequence several FRAs that increased the costs of the 
State (Tribunal de Contas, 2008). Curiously, the public partner guaranteed some exotic risks, 
such as compensations to the private partner if the corporate tax increases (Arroja, 2012).  
Furthermore, as already mentioned, the private partner may have more ability to face more 
risks. This may be due to the fact that, in a PPP contract, the private partner is usually 
comprised of more than one entity and each of them usually has different capacities and 
knowledge regarding different fields. This may contribute for the success of the PPP. However, 
this capacity of the private partner can have a negative impact. The private partner can use its 
knowledge and information to gain a privileged position (if the public sector does not protect 
itself), and act in a way that can be prejudicial for the public partner during the negotiation 
process. This reinforces the idea put forward in the previous section regarding the role of the 
State (Cardoso, 2011). 
In Appendix 2, there is a list of risks and their explanations. 
2.2.3. Transparency 
As defined by the OECD, transparency is the “openness about policy intentions, formulation 
and implementation – is a key element of good governance”. This is correlated with better 
                                                     
17 It is important to have enough competition in order to have an effective risk-allocation. The OECD distinguishes two different 
processes of competition: 
 Competition in the bidding process: This “improves the bargaining position of the government and prevents 
opportunistic (monopolistic) behaviour on the part of the private bidders. Thus, it helps a government to attain better 
VfM” (OECD, 2008).  Therefore, if the number of competitors is limited, the PPP model should not be applied, since it 
can compromise the achievement of the best VfM (Burger et Hawkesworth, 2011). 
 Competition in the provision of the service: This is after the contract signing. It “ensures that the private partner delivers 
the agreed VfM because competition prevents moral hazard and limits the capacity of the private partner to force the 
government to renegotiate the terms of the contract. In the absence of competition, the government may, in effect, 




outcomes, economically and socially (OECD, 2002). In Portugal, there are some examples that 
illustrate that this aspect must be improved. For example, the NAO, the entity responsible for 
evaluating projects and that can decide on their impracticability, realized that some contracts 
were not fully disclosed. In 2009, the NAO refused to sign the prior approval regarding five 
projects, and one of the reasons was the financial conditions for the State. After the NAO 
received a new version of those contracts, which presented lower costs for the State, they were 
approved. Nevertheless, in May 2012, the NAO said that the planned contingent liabilities were 
not presented. In reality, the NPV of the costs in the new version of the contracts plus the cost 
with contingent liabilities is equal to the NPV of the cost in the initial version of the contracts. 
Thus, the financial responsibility for the State remained the same (Arroja, 2012; Ernst & Young, 
2012; Assembleia da República, 2013). This situation is common in other countries too. 
Governments make agreements with private partners that have potentially high, yet hidden, 
costs (Schwartz, Corbacho et Funke, 2008). This is a problem that arises with contingent 
liabilities associated with the PPP model. This is a potential liability, which is only converted as 
an actual liability if a certain event occurs (OECD, 2002; PPIAF, 2012) (See more information 
about contingent liabilities in Appendix 3). Specifically, in this dissertation, it is relevant to 
write about budget transparency, if in the State Budget (“the single most important policy 
document of governments” (OECD, 2002)) all information regarding fiscal issues (all direct 
costs and contingent liabilities) is fully and systematically disclosed (OECD, 2002).  
2.2.4. Accountability, Affordability and Budgeting 
The accounting methodology regarding PPPs has, in recent years, been a theme of regular 
discussion both at a national and international level. “PPPs are not only challenging 
managerially but also give rise to problems of budget control and accountability. Budget 
formulation and accounting processes play critical roles in determining the impact that PPPs 
will in fact have on fiscal policy, resource allocation and public management” (Posner, Ryu et 
Tkachenko, 2009). 
There are different accounting methodologies, but some can create more incentives to apply the 
PPP model when a State wants to invest in public procurement. Actually, in some countries, the 
accounting has been one of the main reasons for choosing a PPP instead of a TIP, which has 
been creating false incentives. Usually, when choosing to invest through a PPP, the investment 
can be off budget. The assets and the debt incurred to buy the assets do not appear in the State’s 
books, only in the books of the involved private entities. In the TIP case, they are registered on 
the State’s books. In the TIP model, the government records expenditures (and debt, if it 
borrows) during the construction phase. In the PPP model, expenditures are usually only 
registered after the construction is complete and are spread out over several years. Thus, in the 




model are higher than when the second model is applied18. Therefore, a PPP may create the 
false impression that it is always a cheaper and more affordable model19. Governments can 
undertake a new project and do not report an increase on their expenditures. Initially, in the 
investment stage, undertaking a PPP project usually does not affect the deficit and the public 
debt. In this situation, governments are pushing expenditures to the future20. This can seem at a 
first glance more tempting for governments that pretend to invest, and even more, in countries 
that face deficit or debt problems (OECD, 2008; Schwartz, Corbacho et Funke, 2008; Posner, 
Ryu et Tkachenko, 2009; Burger et Hawkesworth, 2011; Funke, Irwin et Rial, 2013; Sarmento, 
2013). 
In this context, it is relevant to understand the concept of affordability. In fact, it is not linked to 
the off-balance sheet nature. It is only related to the intertemporal budget constraint of the 
government. This concept means that the expenditure of the government can be accommodated 
within the aforementioned constraint21. Thus, this is related to the concept of sustainability. 
Choosing between a TIP and a PPP should not depend on the accounting methodology, but on 
the affordability and VfM22. To conclude, using the PPP model may lead to greater 
affordability, only if it increases the VfM, and consequently, if the project fits the intertemporal 
budget constraint23. In fact, the question of affordability is not due to the off the books 
characteristic. However, the analysis of whether a project is affordable or not is sometimes 
neglected because of this characteristic of PPPs (OECD, 2008 and 2012; Funke, Irwin et Rial, 
2013). Furthermore, it should be taken into account that, even if the country is investing in an 
effective project with VfM, this may crowd out other potential spending (Posner, Ryu et 
Tkachenko, 2009).   
At this stage, it is possible to identify two challenges regarding PPP. Firstly, policy-makers 
cannot think, fallaciously, that if a project is off budget it is more affordable. Secondly, to assess 
affordability, they have to budget for a longer-time horizon. Actually, this does not always 
happen, governments usually only budget for the upcoming year. However, this is not always an 
easy task. In fact, usually there is uncertainty regarding costs and contingencies. Costs are 
                                                     
18 See more information regarding expenditures and revenues in each model in the Appendix 1. 
19 It is a false impression, because the future payment commitments from the government to the private partner may be forgotten.  
20 In the short run, a PPP always reduces the government capital expenditure. However, analysing the present value, this may not be 
a cheaper option. This depends on the interest expenditure (“the interest rate paid by the private sector usually exceeds that of the 
public sector”) and on the efficiency (OECD, 2008). “In the absence of efficiency gains, PPPs and publicly financed projects have a 
similar long-run effect on public finances” (Funke, Irwin et Rial, 2013). Moreover, transferring mandatory costs to the future, it 
reduces the capacity of governments to “use spending cuts or shifts as instruments of countercyclical economic policy” (Posner, Ryu 
et Tkachenko, 2009). 
21 “The future revenue stream of the government equals or exceeds the present value of the sum of expected future interest payments 
and the present value of the government’s expected non-interest expenditure” (OECD, 2008). 
22They are the two “benchmarks for PPP viability” (OECD, 2008).  
23 “If the use of a PPP instead of public financing does not change the net present value of the government’s cash flows, the PPP 
does not make investment more affordable. If the government cannot afford to finance the project using traditional public finance, it 
probably cannot afford to undertake it as a PPP. Conversely, if the government can afford to undertake the project as a PPP, it can 




uncertain and difficult to predict, even direct fiscal commitments24, because they are long term 
and sometimes depend on variables for which predictions change over time (example: demand 
and exchange rate25). Moreover, there are other commitments, like contingent liabilities, which 
are difficult to quantify. This increases the difficulty concerning the assessment of affordability 
(OECD, 2008; Duarte, 2011; PPIAF, 2012). However, there are some recommendations that 
governments should follow to eliminate false incentives. They should provide more information 
regarding the future burden with PPPs. This information should include not only existing 
contracts but also planned contracts. Then, these predictions should be integrated in long-term 
fiscal projections. In fact, the budgeting can be reformulated to reduce the bias. For instance, the 
treatment of PPPs on budgets can be equal to the treatment of publicly financed projects, 
requiring the same type of approval and planning. Other example is the two-stage budgeting 
process. Firstly, all projects must be approved, assuming that they are publicly financed, and 
only thereafter, the method of financing is decided (Funke, Irwin et Rial, 2013). 
The question of affordability is a constraint regarding public investment. In addition to this, 
some countries face other constraint: fiscal rules26.This may also create incentives in favour of 
PPPs. Governments may only be able to pursue the objective of investing on a certain project by 
using a PPP27. As previously said, this is decided based on the off the books PPPs’ 
characteristic, instead of assessing if the project represents better VfM.  
Moreover, as initially mentioned, different accounting methodologies applied in national 
budgets regarding PPPs may have different impacts on the bias in their favour. In the majority 
of countries cash accounting is applied, while in others accrual accounting or a mix of the two28. 
These methods record expenditures and revenues differently. The cash-based method records 
them when cash is exchanged (when it is received or paid out). Contrarily, the accrual-based 
method records when they are incurred, when there is a decision, independently of the moment 
of payment. In the first method, a government would have less incentive for capital spending, 
because it would have to record it up front (during the design and construction phases). In the 
accrual regime, it is paid over time. Thus, this “can smooth out capital funding and overcome 
the spikes associated with cash-based budgets” (Posner, Ryu et Tkachenko, 2009). Countries 
with cash-based regimes that wish to intensify public infrastructures have few options to do so, 
such as, raise taxes, levy user fees, cut spending in other areas, etc. However, these are painful 
options. Therefore, a PPP seems to be the way to achieve their objective and, at the same time, 
                                                     
24 Direct commitments: upfront payments and ongoing payments (example: shadow tolls and availability payments) (PPIAF, 2012). 
See more information in Appendix 3. 
25 When payments are made in a foreign currency. 
26 “Budgetary limits imposed either legally or as political commitments” (OECD, 2008). For example, Portugal is under the Stability 
Growth Pact, which requires countries not to have deficits above 3% of GDP (OECD, 2008). 
27 Actually, “fiscal pressures were a prime consideration for using PPPs in some of the eight countries studied. Budget officials in 
Hungary, for instance, said that bringing the deficit under the 3% target has been critical since its entry into the EU in 2003. When 
compared to traditional government capital investment, PPPs are a strategy to undertake capital projects with minimal impact on the 
deficit” (Posner, Ryu et Tkachenko, 2009). 





to overcome the spiking problem, since it does not encumber budgets in the short-run. This also 
explains the increased preference for this model (OECD, 2008; Posner, Ryu et Tkachenko, 
2009). Adding to the aforementioned information that governments should disclose, they should 
also apply the accrual method. This is “more challenging, but potentially more influential” in 
reducing the bias in favour of PPPs. In addition to this, the most important indicators of the debt 
and deficit, such as indicators that are applied to set fiscal rules, should change (Funke, Irwin et 
Rial, 2013)29.  
Portugal has been improving the way to deal with PPPs (Posner, Ryu et Tkachenko, 2009). The 
National Budget has appended a memo with predicted net costs for each sector in a long-run 
perspective. This is considered an excellent example of transparency (Posner, Ryu et 
Tkachenko, 2009; Moreno, 2010; OECD, 2013). However, there are still some flaws. Firstly, 
they usually include neither costs regarding projects to be launched nor additional burdens 
related to potential FRAs. Secondly, in the SBs there is no information about the accounting 
methodology. Thirdly, the costs with each specific project are not known. These were some of 
the ingredients that led to sustainability problems; it is a burden that both the present and future 
generations have to pay with painful sacrifices (Moreno, 2010). Moreover, the main problem 
was that the State wanted to invest in infrastructures without30 initially using its own31 money to 
face the high prices of this type of investments. Thus, the State took advantage of the 
accounting system (Moreno, 2010; Arroja, 2012). PPPs were the way to invest even in periods 
with strict budget constraints and external fiscal rules. They were associated to a budgetary 
relief regarding the initial investment (Schwartz, Corbacho et Funke, 2008; Arroja, 2012). This 
problem is linked to the lack of fiscal clarity related to PPPs. If there are no rules to address and 
manage the fiscal consequences of PPPs, they “can be used to bypass budget or borrowing 
limits” (PPIAF, 2012). In Portugal, this example of financial engineering apparently brought 
benefits to some economic agents. The State managed to provide goods and services without 
increasing the public debt. Therefore, governments increased their probability of winning the 
following elections. On the other hand, private partners made good businesses, with almost no 
risks and high profitability. Moreover, it was also fruitful for the banks that financed these 
projects. However, these contracts did not bring many advantages for the tax payers, actually, 
the costs are mainly covered by taxes that are launched annually in the SB (Moreno, 2010; 
Arroja, 2012). 
In this context, and as conclusion, the OECD recommends that these projects “should not be 
used as a vehicle for escaping budgetary discipline by hiving financial commitments off public 
sector balance sheets” (OECD, 2007). All projects should be included in the State Budget, 
                                                     
29 This “requires ensuring that these treat investment in PPPs as public investment that creates both public assets and public 
liabilities” (Funke, Irwin et Rial, 2013). 
30 Or with low commitments 




except if all risks are transferred to the private partner. Actually, “guarantees (implicit or 
explicit) need to be accounted for and should be subject to a similar degree of scrutiny during 
public budget processes as other spending”, in order for the public sector not to forget their 
potentially high fiscal implications (OECD, 2007). 
2.2.5. Renegotiations and FRAs 
A renegotiation is the consequence of a process between the two involved entities, which is 
related to changes in the base-case32. This occurs when initial assumptions of the contract are 
revised. FRAs are requested when one of the partners does not comply with the contract. It is 
usually written in the contracts in which scenarios they can be requested (Cardoso, 2011; 
Sarmento, 2013)33.  
Theoretically, a renegotiation brings advantages for this type of contracts. They are long-term 
contracts (the average, in Portugal, is 30 years), so it is difficult to design complete contracts 
with all details. Contrarily, short-term contracts can be easily reviewed and modified. Therefore, 
renegotiations in PPP contracts may become occasionally inevitable (OECD, 2007;  Posner, 
Ryu et Tkachenko, 2009; Cardoso, 2011)34. Circumstances change during the contractual 
period, so the contract should accommodate these alterations. In fact, “no contract is flexible 
enough to cover every eventuality” (OECD, 2007). Moreover, an excessively detailed contract 
may encourage partners to “look for loopholes” instead of making this relation work. Therefore, 
there should be a balance between flexibility and strictness. A certain degree of strictness is a 
source of confidence for all entities involved in the project. This balance is related to risk-
allocation, since with rigid contracts, more risks are allocated to the public partner. And, with 
flexible contracts, more risks are allocated to the private partner, but the price premium may be 
higher (OECD, 2007; Schwartz, Corbacho et Funke, 2008; Burger et Hawkesworth, 2011).  
According to the OECD, the best option is to “include contractual stipulations specifying under 
what circumstances revisions to the original agreement shall be considered. Permanent and 
active review panels, dispute committees and arbitrational instances should be established as 
part of the contractual structure and operated to strengthen the parties’ relationships” (OECD, 
2007). 
In Portugal, each contract specifies when a FRA may be requested. Some examples of those 
specifications are: when there is an unilateral imposition by the public partner, in other words 
when it changes what was initially defined, and this implies an increase in costs or a decrease in 
revenues for the private partner. Other examples are when there is a case of force majeure or a 
modification in a specific law (Cardoso, 2011). A FRA is usually established by using as 
                                                     
32 The base-case is the principal instrument of reference for the partners, which has all the economic-financial assumptions and 
projections (Cardoso, 2011). 
33 The Appendix 4 presents the process of renegotiation in Portugal. 
34 “Principle 18: Occasional renegotiations are inevitable in long-term partnerships, but they should be conducted in good faith, in a 




reference the base-case, and it has the objective of achieving the minimum values of some 
financial ratios35. To accomplish this objective, the public partner, for example, may have to pay 
a direct compensation, and/or change the deadline of the contract and/or change its financial 
obligations (Cardoso, 2011). On the other hand, the public partner may want to renegotiate a 
contract, for example, to deal with changes in technology or fiscal constraints. However, 
sometimes this cannot happen, because the private partner has to approve it (Posner, Ryu et 
Tkachenko, 2009). 
As aforementioned, there are potential advantages regarding renegotiations of PPP contracts. 
However, there are some examples of problematic situations. In Portugal, some projects were 
renegotiated several times, and in most cases, this significantly increased the costs for the 
State36. Another example lies on the conclusions of Chilean officials, in which payments ended 
up being 35% higher than what was initially decided due to renegotiations. Therefore, they 
became an extra problem linked to PPP contracts for the public partner, bringing only partial 
benefits, in other words, only benefiting private partners (Posner, Ryu et Tkachenko, 2009; 
Cardoso, 2011; Arroja, 2012). This is the result of some of the aforementioned challenges, such 
as asymmetry of information, better negotiation skills of private partners and optimistic 
proposals during the tendering process (Tribunal de Contas, 2008; Posner, Ryu et Tkachenko, 
2009; Cardoso, 2011). 
According to Ernst & Young, the burden of the State should consider not only the costs 
regarding regular activity, but also the processes of FRAs that are contractually defined, and 
which could be the reason for a cost increase and a source of uncertainty (Ernst & Young, 
2012). 
2.3. PPPs in Portugal 
In this dissertation, the case study is the situation in Portugal. Before analysing the predicted 
costs for the Portuguese State, an overview of the PPP projects is presented. 
Since the 90´s, several countries have been increasingly applying the PPP model (OECD, 2008; 
Burger et Hawkesworth, 2011)37. Portugal is not an exception and since 1992 it has been 
developing projects by PPPs. The first project was the Vasco da Gama bridge. Since then, 
Portugal has become one of the leaders in Europe (Moreno, 2010)38. Nowadays, there are PPPs 
in several sectors, such as road, railway, health and security39.The road sector is the one with 
                                                     
35 Source: Decree-Law n. 141/2006, Article 14th- C 
Examples: Internal rate of return to shareholders (IRR) and Debt-Service Coverage Ratio (DSCR) (Cardoso, 2011). 
36 According to Abrantes de Sousa (2011), there were very good contracts at the beginning, but, over the years, they have become 
unrecognizable (cited by Arroja 2012). Moreover, according to Moreno, since 1992 in Portugal, it is not easy to identify a contract 
that was not renegotiated, and consequently, without higher costs for the public partner (Moreno, 2010). 
37 See the History of PPPs in Appendix 5. 
38 “With a ratio of between 1.2% and 1.3% of GDP, Portugal has the highest PPP-to-GDP ratio in Europe (nearly double the United 
Kingdom ratio of between 0.6% and 0.7%)” (OECD, 2008). 
39 These are the areas that the respective costs for the State are presented in SBs. Others public concessions, such as of the 




more projects and with a higher burden for the State. It represents 80% of future costs (Bult-
Spiering et Dewulf, 2006; Arroja, 2012). This is the reason why it is analysed the road sector in 
this dissertation. Furthermore, the most used type of PPP is the concession contract (see more 
information in Appendix 6), in which the private partner is responsible for the conception, the 
financing, the construction, the maintenance, and the operation of infrastructures. In the 
following section, the financial linkages between the two partners are presented. In order to 
understand some of what will be said, it is worthwhile to mention that, in Portugal, it is also 
considered a PPP when the equivalent to a private partner is a public company, a cooperative, or 
a non-profit private institution. One example is Estradas de Portugal, S.A. (EP). Although the 
EP’s concessions are not directly held by the State, the SBs include the costs supported by the 
concession EP. (See more information about the EP in Appendix 7). 
2.3.1. Financing of projects and Costs for the State 
This type of model is characterized by the way of financing. Private partners are responsible for 
part or total financing of projects. They have to mobilize the necessary financial resources in 
order to invest and operate the assets of the partnership, so there is a bigger financial effort by 
the private partner during the construction stage. The financing typically has two components, 
one is equity and another is debt capital. It may use bank financing and/or take advantage of EU 
funds40. This is usually compensated by payments along the contract’s period from the public to 
the private partner. In several projects, the payments during the lifespan of the projects are 
contractually defined (OECD, 2008; DGTF, 2009; Cardoso, 2011; Ernst & Young, 2012). 
However, the cost and the revenue for each partner can be different, depending on each contract. 
The private partner, typically, has two sources of revenue to overcome the cost of the 
investment on the infrastructure: the aforementioned payments/subsidies from the public sector 
(if these are the main source, it is called government-funded PPP) and fees paid by the users, 
like tolls in the road sector (if these are the main source, it is called user-funded PPP). 
Generally, from the public to the private partner, there are two types of fiscal commitments: 
direct liabilities and contingent liabilities (OECD, 2008; PPIAF, 2012; Funke, Irwin et Rial, 
2013).  
In this dissertation, the focus is on expenditures of the State with PPPs in the road sector. In this 
way, in the following section, there is a description of the normal costs for the Portuguese State 
with this sector. In Appendix 8, there is information regarding other sectors. 
2.3.2. Road Sector 
The type of concessions varies according to two factors, namely Ownership and Payments 
(Cardoso, 2011). Regarding this last factor, in Portugal, there are the two aforementioned 
                                                     
40 In fact, “privately financed projects are mainly carried through in the roads sector because of EU subsidies and credits with low 




scenarios: payments from the public sector and from users to the private partner. About the 
ownership of the assets, usually, after the contract’s period, the public partner is the owner of 
the asset. Therefore, the residual value risk is allocated to the public partner (OECD, 2008). 
The type of contracts in this sector is generally Design-Build-Finance-Operate-Transfer 
(DBFOT) (Cardoso, 2011). Globally, nowadays, twenty-three contracts are included in the SB.  
 
Concerning the payments from the public sector, there are mainly payments for availability, for 
traffic service and for the service of tolls’ collection. Thus, the contracts can be divided into 
three different groups, according to the delivered service and payments to private partners (Ernst 
& Young, 2012; DGTF, 2012): 
 
1) Traditional concession with real tolls: 
These are concessions of the State, and the real tolls are for the concessionaires. In other words, 
the private partner receives payments directly from the users (the tolls), which is their main 
source of revenue, and does not receive ongoing payments from the State. Therefore, these 
concessions, usually, have neither regular costs nor regular revenues for the public partner. 
There are five examples of this, which are Brisa, Oeste, Lusoponte, Douro Litoral and Litoral 
Centro. 
2) Concessions with model of availability: 
In this type of model, the EP retains the tolls, and in exchange it has to pay the concessionaries 
for the availability. This is a fixed payment that is paid on a regular basis, independently of the 
demand, but that can be reduced in case of unavailability (e.g. accidents and construction). This 
means that this payment only changes if the quality of the infrastructure is not what was defined 
in the contract41.  
In this case, the demand risk is allocated to the public side (the revenues of the EP depend on 
the traffic). However, there are some advantages. An example of these is the protection of the 
public interest, since it gives financial incentives to concessionaires to deliver the service and 
have the infrastructure within negotiated standards. Other example is that the cost for the public 
partner is not uncertain; in fact, they “will never exceed the maximum availability payment” 
(Dochia et Parker, 2009; Ernst & Young, 2012). 
                                                     
41 A few remarks on the model of availability: 
 Definition of availability in the Portuguese Law: 
“a disponibilidade das vias consiste na aferição da qualidade do serviço prestado aos utentes e a aferição dos níveis de 
sinistralidade e dos níveis de externalidades por elas geradas” Source: Decree-Law n. 110/ 2009 18th of May.  
 It can be divided into two categories (Ernst & Young, 2012): 
“Pure availability”- the infrastructure or part of it has to be available for the purpose that was built, without any 
obstruction.  





Some examples are Grande Lisboa, Norte42 and the seven ex-SCUTs: Grande Porto, Norte 
Litoral, Costa de Prata, Beira Litoral e Alta, Interior Norte, Beira Interior and Algarve.  
Previously, SCUTs were concessions with shadow tolls, in which the revenues of the private 
partner, called rents, were totally paid by the State (Cardoso, 2011). The direct payments from 
the State to private partners were a function of the traffic level. In this case, the user-payer 
system was substituted by the tax-payer system. In other words, it was the State who paid the 
tolls instead of the user of the roads (Bult-Spiering et Dewulf, 2006; Moreno, 2010; Ernst & 
Young, 2012; Estradas de Portugal, 2012). (See in the Appendix 9 the contract of Costa de Prata 
after the renegotiation) 
 
3) With model of availability payments and payments for the service: 
The EP receives tolls as revenues, and is has to do two kinds of payments to the private partner. 
It pays for the availability (this is the fixed counterpart for the availability of the infrastructure) 
and for the service, which is related to the traffic. So, these contracts have a fixed and a variable 
part (according to the traffic level). There are eight examples: the Túnel do Marão and the sub 
concessions Pinhal Interior, Litoral Oeste, Douro Interior, Baixo Tejo, Baixo Alentejo, 
Transmontana and Algarve Litoral (DGTF, 2012; Ernst & Young, 2012; Estradas de Portugal, 
2012). (See in the Appendix 10 the contract of Transmontana) 
                                                     




3. Methodology and Data Collection 
3.1. Data Collection 
 
The aim of this dissertation is to analyse the predictions presented in ten different State Budgets 
regarding how much the State will spend with PPP in the road sector during the period 2014-
2031. In fact, different State Budgets present different predictions for the same period.  These 
differences are also identified by Moreno (2010). He mentioned that in SB 2009, the NPV of the 
predicted net costs for the road sector was around 12 000 M€, whereas, in 2010, it was around 
5 000 M€. Without explanation there is this huge difference, which he called a blackout 
(Moreno, 2010).Therefore, my objective is to understand the reason for those differences. 
As a note, this analysis focuses only in gross costs. The gross costs for the State in this sector 
include contracted remunerations, investment’s compensations and accepted Financial Re-
equilibrium Agreements (FRAs) (UTAP, 2013). 
 
Since the State Budget only presents the total predicted costs for the road sector, the Estradas de 
Portugal provided me the costs per project in order to be able to do this analysis. Thus, the data 
base is the predicted gross costs per project (24 PPP projects in the road sector) for the period 
2014-2031 presented in ten different State Budgets (from SB 200543 to SB 2014).   
 
For each project and for each SB I computed the Present Value (PV) of the predicted costs, 
corresponding to the sum of cash flows of the period 2014-2031. Thus, the difference of PVs 
will not be explained by the number of years. Nevertheless, I had to be cautious since the values 
were not immediately comparable. In some SBs, the values included the VAT, and some present 
the values at current prices and others at constant prices.  
 
Therefore, firstly, in the SBs that included the VAT, I divided the values by the VAT, in order 
to have all predicted costs without VAT. The following rates were used (for SBs where the rate 
was not given, but it is said that the VAT is included, I applied the VAT of the end of the 





                                                     




SB VAT Source/ Information 
2005 19% Given by EP 
2006 21% Given by EP 
2007 21% Given by EP 
2008 21% Direcção-Geral dos Impostos, 2011 
2009 20% Given by EP 
2010 - Prices without VAT 
2011 - Prices without VAT  
2012 23% PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2012 
2013 23% PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2013 
2014 23% SB 2014 
Table 1: VAT 
 
Secondly, I computed the PV, but I had to take into account that some SBs presented the costs 
at current prices and others at constant prices. Therefore, for SB at constant prices I discounted 
the values at the rate of 4%, and for SBs at current prices I discounted at 6,08%. The rate 6,08% 
is the official discount rate of the State. It is composed by a real discount rate that is fixed in 4% 
and by a discount rate of the annual inflation, which was administratively fixed by the Despacho 
nº 13208/2003 in 2% (Ernst & Young, 2012). In this way, I obtained the PV for each SB with 
base-year the year of the corresponding SB. For example, I obtained for the SB 2006 the PV of 
the predicted costs with base-year 2006, whereas for the SB 2014, the PV with base-year 2014. 
Therefore, then, I converted all for the same base-year (2005). In order to do this, I used the real 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) (Source: INE, 2014). Since there is not the real CPI for 2014, I 
applied the predicted CPI growth rate presented in the SB 2014. 




Y-axis: PV of predicted costs for the State (M€) 




Analysing all the graphs, I could identify the differences from one SB to another. After this 
identification, I analysed possible explanations for those differences. To assess this, I analysed 
each PPP in the road sector (24 projects) and each State Budget (10 SBs, from the SB 2005 to 
2014). In this way I recognized the main events regarding PPPs in the road sector. Then, I 
computed an econometric model based on panel data, which is described immediately. 
 
3.2. Econometric Analysis 
The analysis is based on a panel data model. The database consists of information on the several 
PPP projects since 2005 until 2014, retrieved from the annual SBs. The model has as dependent 
variable the logarithm of the PV of the predicted costs with regards to each project in each SB. 
The main objective of this analysis is to identify the factors that affect the predicted costs. 
3.2.1. Independent variables 
 
 Characteristics of concessions: CAPEX and Kilometres 
Since I have panel data and I aim to understand the differences of the predictions over SBs, I 
have to take into account that projects are different. Hence, I include in the model these control 
variables, which may explain the differences from one project to another. 
Actually, large scale projects, which can be translated as projects with higher CAPEX and more 
kilometres, represent projects that may have a higher burden for the State. CAPEX refers to the 
initial investment, which is one of the responsibilities of the private partners. These variables 
would explain why some projects have low costs and others have high costs. For instance, the 
concession Beiras Litoral e Alta, over the SBs, has PVs of the predicted costs around 902 M€. 
This contrasts with a smaller scale project as the concession Algarve, which presents values 
around 395 M€. The source of information was Cardoso (2011).  
 
 Characteristics of concessions: Risk allocation 
As explained earlier, in the Literature Review, risk allocation is an important feature of a PPP 
project and it can affect the cost for the State. In fact, costs related to FRAs are the outcome of 
the systems of risk sharing foreseen in the contracts (Assembleia da República, 2013). This 
variable is based on the matrix of risks for each project presented in the report of the Direcção 
Geral do Tesouro e das Finanças (DGTF, 2012). This report identifies several risks for each 
project. Regarding each risk, the report identifies if for a specific project that risk is shared, is 









Failure to meet 
quality levels 
Inflation (…) 
Algarve private public Public private (…) 
Baixo 
Alentejo private public Private shared 
(…) 
(…) (…) (…) (…) (…) (…) 
Table 2: Example of the matrix of risk allocation 
 
I defined some criteria in order to create a variable that represents the information provided in 
this report. For each project, if a certain risk is allocated to the public sector, I attributed the 
number one. If the risk is shared, I attributed 0,5, otherwise it is zero. 
 





Failure to meet 
quality levels 
Inflation (…) 
Algarve 0 1 1 0 (…) 
Baixo 
Alentejo 0 1 0 0.5 
(…) 
(…) (…) (…) (…) (…) (…) 
Table 3: Example of the matrix of risk allocation 
 
In addition to this, I took into account the level of the risk, in other words, the probability of a 
certain risk to occur and its impact. In fact, for each risk, the report says if the probability of 
occurrence is high, medium or low, and it says if the risk would have a strong, medium or 





















Then, I multiplied this score by the allocation of the risk. For example, risk X for a certain 
project is allocated to the public partner and the probability of occurrence is medium and it 
would have a strong impact, thus, the score is 1×2×3=6. In this way, I got a table like the 
following: 
 




Failure to meet 
quality levels 
Inflation (…) 
Algarve 0 3 2 0 (…) 
Baixo 
Alentejo 0 3 0 1.5 
(…) 
(…) (…) (…) (…) (…) (…) 
Table 6: Example of the matrix of risk allocation 
 
Finally, for each project I summed all scores and I got a total score. For example: 








Algarve 0 3 2 0 (…) 39,5 
Baixo 
Alentejo 0 3 0 1.5 
(…) 
31 
(…) (…) (…) (…) (…) (…) (…) 
Table 7: Example of the matrix of risk allocation 
 
At the end, the total score is the independent variable that I include in the econometric model. It 
can vary from 0 if all risks are allocated to the private partner, and the maximum score is 279, if 
all risks are fully borne by the public partner and those risks would have high probability of 
occurrence and strong impact. Thus, this variable means if a project has a higher score, more 













  Risk Score
Algarve 39.5 
Beira Interior 39.5 
Interior Norte 39.5 
Costa de Prata 39.5 
Grande Porto 39.5 
Norte Litoral 39.5 





Litoral Centro 26 
Grande Lisboa 39.5 
Douro Litoral 26 
Transmontana 31 
Douro Interior 31 
Túnel do Marão 39.5 
Baixo Alentejo 31 
Baixo Tejo 31 
Litoral Oeste 31 
Algarve Litoral 31 
Pinhal Interior 31 
AE Centro 31 
A21/Rota Oeste 31 
Table 8: Risk score per project 
 
In the report of the DGTF, there is no information about the AE Centro and A21/ Rota Oeste. 
Nevertheless, I assumed that their score is equal to 31. Since it is the score of the sub 
concessions of EP, and this entity is also the direct public partner of the AE Centro and A21/ 
Rota Oeste44. 
These scores should change over time because the allocation of risks has changed for some 
projects. Nevertheless, the DGTF only presents the allocation of risks’ matrix in one of its 





                                                     




 Characteristics of concessions: SCUTs model, availability payments model, model with 
payments for availability and service and traditional concessions 
In Portugal, PPPs projects in the road sector can be divided into different types, according to the 
delivered service and payments to private partners (Ernst & Young, 2012; DGTF, 2012). There 
are traditional concessions with real tolls, concessions with model of availability, concessions 
with payments for the availability and for the service and there were projects with shadow tolls 
(SCUTs). 
Traditional concessions with real tolls include projects that usually do not have costs for the 
State, the private partner receives payments directly from the users. These projects are Brisa, 
Oeste, Lusoponte, Douro Litoral and Litoral Centro. Concessions with model of availability are 
projects with fixed and regular payments from the public partner to the private partner and users 
have to pay tolls. They are Grande Lisboa, Norte45 and the seven ex-SCUTs: Grande Porto, 
Norte Litoral, Costa de Prata, Beira Litoral e Alta, Interior Norte, Beira Interior and Algarve. 
Previously, SCUTs were concessions with shadow tolls, on which, there were direct payments 
from the State to private partners and no costs for users. Moreover, there are concessions 
payments for the availability and for the service. In this case, the public partner has to do two 
kinds of payments to the private partner. There are eight examples: the Túnel do Marão and the 
sub concessions Pinhal Interior, Litoral Oeste, Douro Interior, Baixo Tejo, Baixo Alentejo, 
Transmontana and Algarve Litoral. 
 
I included in the model, dummies variables with regard to these types of projects. For example 
the Transmontana is a project with payments for availability and service, thus, this project has 
one in the variable model with payments for availability and zero in the other variables. 
In order to avoid multicollinearity problems, I will not include all variables. Thus, the variable 
traditional concession is not included in the model. 
By including these variables I will understand if the costs for the State depend on the model and 
I will identify if some types are more costly than others. In addition to this, the variable model 
with payments for availability has a double meaning. It can also represent renegotiations of 
contracts. In fact, most of the renegotiations are related to changes of the type, and all the 
projects that changed from one type to another, they changed to the model with payments for 
availability. The SCUTs changed from models with shadow tolls to availability payments, as 
well as, the concessions Norte and Grande Lisboa that changed from traditional concessions to 




                                                     




 Characteristics of concessions: North, Centre, Lisbon, South and More than a region 
PPPs projects in the road sector were built in different regions of Portugal. I include in the 
model dummy variables with regard to the geographical location of the projects. In this way, I 
will identify if projects built in some areas have more costs for the State than in other areas. 
Thus, they are also control variables, which may explain different predictions over projects and 
not over time. 
To compute these variables, I divided the Portuguese territory by NUTS II (Nomenclature of 
territorial units for statistics): North, Centre, Lisbon, Alentejo, Algarve, Azores and Madeira. 
However, there are not project in Azores and Madeira. Moreover, in Alentejo, there is only one 
project, thus, projects in Alentejo and Algarve are included in the same variable, South. In 
addition to these, some projects are in more than one geographical area, I included these 
projects in a variable called More than a region. In order to avoid multicollinearity problems, I 
will not include all variables. Thus, the variable traditional South is not included in the model. 
 
 Economic variable: GDP growth 
The variable GDP growth is based on the predictions for this rate presented in each SB. This 
variable was included in the model in order to understand the influence of the economic 
environment on the predicted costs for the State with PPPs. According to the Literature Review, 
governments often undertake PPP projects because initially they usually do not affect the deficit 
and the public debt. Therefore, it would be more tempting for a government to apply this model 
during a difficult economic period.  
 
 Political Variable: Troika 
The variable Troika is a dummy variable that is one in the SB 2012, 2013 and 2014, which are 
the years that Portugal is under the Financial Assistance Programme. Troika is consisted by 
three entities, namely the European Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the 
International Monetary Fund. In Portugal since April 2011, it has defined a set of measures for 
the country to execute as a counterpart of the external financing provided by these entities. To 
note that one of the measures was exactly the renegotiation of PPPs, in order to reduce the 




                                                     
46 “Following the strategic plan presented by the government, PPP road contracts will be renegotiated in order to obtain substantial 
fiscal gains, notably in 2013, while ensuring a sustainable reduction in government liabilities” Source: Memorandum of 











Min. Max. Info. 
PV of the costs 194 4,61 2,66 0 7,32 Logarithm 
CAPEX 194 6,22 0,62 5,11 7,87 Logarithm 
Kilometres 194 4,92 0,83 3,18 7,00 Logarithm 
Risk allocation 194 34,70 6,19 26 40,5 Unit: score (from 0 to 279) 
GDP growth 194 0,39 1,47 -2,8 2,4 Unit: % 
SCUTs model 194 0,23 0,42 0 1 1=SCUT, 0=other model 
availability 
payments model 







194 0,28 0,45 0 1 
1=payments for availability 
and service, 0=other model 
North 194 0,32 0,47 0 1 
1=project is located in the 
North of Portugal, 0=other 
region 
Centre 194 0,35 0,48 0 1 
1=project is located in the 
Centre of Portugal, 0=other 
region 
Lisbon 194 0,13 0,34 0 1 
1=project is located in the 
Lisbon area, 0=other region 
More than a region 194 0,08 0,28 0 1 
1=project is located in more 
than one region, 0=project is 
located in only one region 
Troika 194 0,35 0,48 0 1 1=2012, 2013, 2014 




                                                     
47 In addition to the aforementioned variables, I also tried to include other variables. Nevertheless, some of them were not 
statistically significant or captured other events. I included a variable that represents the interest rate of the public debt, but, it was 
not statistically significant. I also included a variable that represented the Government party during the discussion of the SB. This 
variable was one if the party Partido Socialista (PS) was in the Government and zero if the party Partido Social Democrático (PSD) 
was in the Government in October (when the SB is discussed). Nevertheless, this variable would be exactly the opposite of the 




4. Analysis of Results 
4.1. Analysis of each project individually 
In this section, I individually analysed the twenty-four projects that are included in the SBs. 
This supports the understanding of the overall reality regarding PPPs in the road sector in 
Portugal. As aforementioned, the twenty-four projects are not all included in all SBs. Some 
projects only integrate the last SBs because they were launched afterwards. The SB 2008 says 
that included projects are not only those that, at the time, were already contracted, but also those 
launched for the tendering process. In Appendix 11 there is information regarding the launch 
date and the contract’s date of each project.  
Oeste 
This project was launched in 1997 (EP, 2011) and the contract’s date is December 21st of 1998 
(Assembleia da República, 2013). It is one of the PPPs with real tolls, based on the principle 
user-payer.  According to the contract, no costs for the State were expected. Thus, theoretically, 
it is predictable that the PV of the predicted costs would be equal to zero in all analysed SBs. By 
analysing the graph in Appendix 12, until the SB 2010, one can see that PVs of the costs are 
zero, as expected. However, from the SB 2010 to the SB 2014, PVs of the costs are higher than 
zero. This means that, in these SBs, there are predicted costs for the State. This may only be 
related to FRAs, since there is not information regarding renegotiations of the base-case. 
Actually, according to the Ernst & Young (2012), there were six requests of FRAs.  
On a curious note, it is expected (but not confirmed), that the concessionary will ask for a new 
compensation because of the decrease in traffic, which is the result of the introduction of tolls in 
the Costa da Prata concession (Assembleia da República, 2013). 
Douro Litoral 
The contract date of this project is December 28th of 2007. However, as far as I am concerned, 
this project should have been included in all analysed SBs, since the launch of the tendering 
process was in 2004.  
Normally, this would be other auto-sustainable project, with real tolls and no costs for the State. 
As well as in the previous project, in Appendix 12, positive PVs of the costs are observable in 
the SBs 2010, 2011 and 2012. These expected costs may be the result of FRAs. In fact, 
concessions with real tolls normally do not have costs for the State, unless there are reasons for 





The launch of the tendering process was in 1999 and the contract’s date is September 30th of 
2004 (EP, 2011). Thus, this project was included in all analysed SBs.  
It is also a concession with real tolls, which normally does not imply costs for the State. The 
source of the concessionary’s revenues are tolls charged from users. A reason for the expected 
costs in the SBs 2013 and 2014 is the approval of FRAs. See, in Appendix 12, the graph of this 
concession. 
Lusoponte  
Lusoponte is considered the first PPP in Portugal (Assembleia da República, 2013). It was 
launched in 1992 and the contract was signed in 1995 (EP, 2011). This is also a concession with 
real tolls, thus, with no costs for the public sector, since all revenues from tolls are for the 
concessionary.  
However, as it is observable in the graph in Appendix 12, there are expected costs in all SBs. 
This is due to several FRAs and a renegotiation.  
The following table has the several FRAs, which were mainly due to unilateral changes 
implemented by the public partner: 
Agreement Date 
FRA I 24th March of 1995 
FRA II 23th September of 1996 
FRA III 17th February of 1997 
FRA IV 22nd February 1999 
FRA V 
(the Global Agreement) 
3rd July 2000 (2nd contract) 
FRA VI 27th November of 2000 
FRA VII 8th June of 2001 
FRA VIII 28th of November of 2008 
FRA IX 29th March of 2012 
Table 10: Lusoponte’s FRAs 
 
Source: Assembleia da República (2013), Pinto (2012) and UTAP (2013) 
 
The first contract involved two bridges, namely, the 25 de Abril bridge and the Vasco da Gama 
bridge. The private partner was responsible for the conception, projection, construction, 
financing, operation and maintenance of the new bridge (Vasco da Gama), and the operation 
and maintenance of the oldest one (25 de Abril). In this contract, there was an exclusivity 
clause, which means that the concessionary has rights regarding any bridge that would cross the 




pay tolls. In fact, the equalitarian principle was established, which means both bridges would 
have the same price for users.  
At the time, this principle was very controversial. Not only there would be tolls during August 
on 25 de Abril bridge, but also the prices would also have to rise for the rest of the months.  This 
was the starting point for the renegotiation of the contract. Actually, there was a protest on July 
24th of 1994 (citizens blocked the bridge). Thus, this led to unilateral changes, such as a non-
actualization of the price of tolls and there were no tolls in August. Therefore, the concessionary 
requested FRAs to “correct the impact of these unilateral changes on the financial balance of the 
project” (Pinto, 2012). 
In the second contract, it was decided that the private partner would be compensated during the 
lifetime of the concession, due to unilateral changes implemented by the public partner 
(Assembleia da República, 2013). In addition to this, there was a change in the risk allocation 
regarding demand risk and financing risk (from private to shared allocation). 
According to Pinto (2012), “the initial funding of the project had no participation of the 
government, it was structured solely with cohesion funds (EU) and private funds. However, 
after 15 years and several FRAs the government has become the biggest contributor to the 
funding of the construction of Vasco da Gama bridge”.  
 
In the graph in Appendix 12, it is observable two significant changes on the predictions. From 
the SB 2008 to 2009 the predicted costs decrease, this may be related to the FRA VIII. The 
other change is the costs’ decrease from the SB 2011 to 2012. This may be also related to a 
FRA, the FRA IX. 
Brisa 
The contract for this concession was signed in 1972. This is one of the traditional concessions 
with real tolls. Thus, theoretically, there are no costs for the State, and in fact, there are not 
predicted costs for the period 2014-2031 in any SB. 
In 1985, the base-case was modified. There were other changes, and the last one was changed 
by the Decree-Law n. 247- C/2008, 30th of November. This was a consequence of the Global 
Agreement between the State, the EP and Brisa on the 22nd of December of 2008. One of the 
reasons for this agreement was requested FRAs from the concessionaire. And, the decisions of 
this agreement were the increase of the lifetime of the contract and the definition of payments 
from the State to the private partner (Assembleia da República, 2013). 
Costa de Prata 
This was launched in 1998 and the contract was signed on May 19th of 2000. This was a SCUT, 
a project with shadow tolls, which payments from the State to the private partner depended on 




management and financing (NMGFSR). After this renegotiation (October 2010), payments from 
the State to the private partner depend on the availability and real tolls were introduced. Thus, 
this renegotiation may impact the predictions in the SB 2011 and subsequent SBs. 
Grande Porto 
This was also a SCUT, a project with shadow tolls. However, real tolls were introduced on July 
5th of 2010, thus, this affects the SB 2011 and subsequent SBs. 
Initially, this was launched in 1998 and the contract was signed on August 28th of 2002. At that 
time, the payments from the State to the private partner depended on the traffic. It was, 
apparently, a free service for users. After the renegotiation, the payments depend on the 
availability.  
Norte Litoral  
This was a SCUT, a project with shadow tolls. However, real tolls were introduced on July 20th 
of 2010, thus, this affects the SB 2011 and subsequent SBs. 
Initially, this was launched in 1999 with the Decree-Law n. 119-B/99 of 14th of April, and the 
contract was signed on August 31st of 2001 (Assembleia da Rpública, 2013). At that time, the 
payments from the State to the private partner depended on the traffic. After the renegotiation, 
the payments depend on the availability.  
Beiras Litoral e Alta 
This was a SCUT, a project with shadow tolls. However, real tolls were introduced on July 5th 
of 2010; thus, this affects the SB 2011 and subsequent SBs. 
Initially, this was launched in 1998 and the contract was signed on the 20th of April of 2001 
(Assembleia da República, 2013). At that time, the payments from the State to the private 
partner depended on the traffic. According to the Assembleia da República (2013), there were 
two main reasons for launching SCUTs’ projects, namely, the fast implementation and the non-
encumbrance of the SB by transferring the financing responsibility to the private sector.   
Interior Norte 
This SCUT project was launched in 1998 and the contract was signed on the December 30thof 
2000 (Assembleia da República, 2013). Like other SCUTs, the total cost for the public partner 
was the sum of contracted payments (SCUT’s tolls), costs with expropriations, with FRAs and 
with the widening of roads (Assembleia da República, 2013). On October 13th of 2011, the 
Government approved the Decree-Law that implements real tolls in this concession48. 
Therefore, this renegotiation affects the SB 2012 and subsequent SBs. 
                                                     




Beira Interior  
This SCUT project was launched in 1997 and the contract was signed in 1999 (EP, 2011). On 
October 13th of 2011, the Government approved the Decree-Law that implements real tolls in 
this concession too49. Therefore, this renegotiation affects the SB 2012 and subsequent SBs. 
Algarve  
This SCUT project was launched in 1998 and the contract was signed in 2000 (EP, 2011). On 
the October 13th of 2011, the Government approved the Decree-Law that implements real tolls 
in this concession too50 . Therefore, this affects SBs from 2012 onwards. 
Norte  
The launch of this project was in 1997 and the contract was signed on July 9th of 1999 (EP, 
2011). In this contract, initially, there were no costs for the State. This explains the graph in 
Appendix 12 until the SB 2010. However, there was a renegotiation of the initial contract. The 
new contract, which was signed on July16th of 2009, established payments for availability from 
the public to the private partner. In fact, this can be easily verified in the graph in Appendix 12. 
Grande Lisboa 
The launch of this project was in 2003 and the contract was signed on January10th of 2007 (EP, 
2011). Thus, this project is included in all SBs. Initially, as observable in Appendix 12, there 
were no expected costs for the State, which corresponds to what was defined in the initial 
contract. However, there was a renegotiation of the contract. The new contract, which was 
signed on July 5th of 2010, established payments for availability from the public to the private 
partner. Thus, this may explain the predicted costs from the SB 2010 onwards that are 
observable in the graph in Appendix 12. 
Túnel do Marão 
The launch of this project was in February of 2007, thus, it is only included from the SB of 2008 
onwards. In fact, it is explicitly said in the SB 2008, that the launch of this project was being 
planned. The contract was signed in April of 2008. 
The costs for the public partner have two components, costs for the availability (a fixed 
component) and payments for the service (which depends on the traffic). 
However, the State decided to terminate the contract on June 17th of 2013. According to the 
Unidade Técnica de Acompanhamento de Projetos (UTAP), this was determined on reasonable 
grounds, and the justification was an infringement by the concessionaire (UTAP, 2013). This 
may be the reason for the decrease from SB 2012 to 2013 that is verified in the graph in 
Appendix 12. 
                                                     
49 Source: DN Portugal (2011) 





The launch of this project was on November 22nd of 2007, thus, it is only included from the SB 
of 2009 onwards (actually, this is explicitly said in the SB of 2009). The contract was signed on 
December 9th of 2008. However, it was rejected on November 2nd of 2009. The new contract 
was signed on June 1st of 2010. This situation is like a renegotiation of the contract, and this 
may be the reason for the difference between SBs 2009 and 2010, which it is observable in the 
graph in Appendix 12. 
The cost for the public partner with this project has two components: costs for the availability 
(fixed) and payments for the service (which depends on the traffic). This is included in the 
group of sub concessions, which are the result of the National Road Plan, signed in 1998 and 
that followed the recommendations of the European Commission. These are the main reasons in 
favour of the development of those sub concessions (Assembleia da República, 2013). 
However, they had some problems. One of them was the rejection of the prior approval from the 
NAO (Assembleia da República, 2013). Actually, in five out of the seven sub concessions 
(Transmontana, Algarve Litoral, Baixo Alentejo, Douro Interior and Litoral Oeste), their initial 
contracts were rejected. Afterwards, there was a process of reformulation of the contracts, and 
these contracts were already approved by the NAO. On a curious note, between the signature of 
the contract and the rejection from the NAO, the construction work had already started. In fact, 
at the time, it was legal to execute the contract before the NAO’s approval51. Thus, if the 
contract was cancelled, the public partner would have to pay high compensations (Assembleia 
da República, 2013). 
Douro Interior  
The launch of this project was on November 22nd of 2007, thus, it is included from the SB of 
2009 (actually, this is explicitly said in the SB of 2009). The contract was signed on the 
November 25th of 2008. However, it was rejected on November 2nd of 2009. The new contract 
was signed on March 15th of 2010. The cost for the public partner with this project has two 
components, costs for the availability (fixed) and payments for the service (which depends on 
the traffic). 
Baixo Alentejo 
The launch of this project was on December 11th of 2007, thus, it is included from the SB of 
2009 onwards (actually, this is explicitly said in the SB of 2009). The contract was signed on 
January 31st of 2009. However, it was rejected on November 17th of 2009. The new contract was 
signed on June 16th of 2010. This may be the reason for the difference between SBs 2009 and 
2010, which it is observable in the graph in Appendix 12. 
                                                     





The launch of this project was on December 11th of 2007, thus, it is included from the SB of 
2009 onwards (actually, this is explicitly said in the SB of 2009). The contract was signed on 
January 24th of 2009. For this project and for the Pinhal Interior, there was also a process of 
reformation of contracts. However, there was no rejection, because they were corrected before 
the request. The final contract was only signed on April 28th of 2010. 
Litoral Oeste 
The launch of this project was in the 1st quarter of 2008, thus, it is included from the SB of 2009 
onwards (actually, this is explicitly said in the SB of 2009). The contract was signed on the 26th 
of February of 2009. However, it was rejected on November 23rd of 2009. The new contract was 
signed on July16th of 2010. 
Algarve Litoral 
The launch of this project was on March 26th of 2008, thus, it is included from the SB of 2009 
onwards (actually, this is explicitly said in the SB of 2009). The contract was signed on April 
20th of 2009. However, it was rejected on November 23rd of 2009. The new contract was signed 
on May 28th of 2010. 
Pinhal Interior 
The launch of this project was on June 12th of 2008, thus, it is included from the SB of 2009 
onwards (actually, this is explicitly said in the SB of 2009). The contract was signed on April 
28th of 2010. For this project and for the Baixo Tejo, there was also a process of contracts’ 
reformation. However, there was no rejection, because they were corrected before the request. 
The final contract was only signed on July19th of 2010. 
AE Centro 
The launch of this project was on the 1st quarter of 2008 (Assembleia da República, 2013), thus, 
it is included in the SB of 2009 (actually, this is explicitly said in the SB of 2009). In addition to 
the seven aforementioned sub concessions, it was determined to launch more, but it did not 
happen. This project is one of the examples. The others are Alto Alentejo, Serra da Estrela, 
Ribatejo, Tejo Internacional and Vouga (Assembleia da República, 2013). As it is observable in 
the graph in Appendix 12, there are only predicted costs in the SB 2009 and 2010. 
A21/ Rota Oeste 
The first time that there is a reference about this project is in the SB 2010. It says that, the 
launching of the tendering process for new roads (Rota Oeste, Ribatejo, Vouga Serra da Estrela 
and Tejo Internacional) would begin during 2010. However, some PPPs were cancelled. An 




4.2 Analysis of each State Budget 
In this section, there is an overall analysis, in which all State Budgets are analysed and 
compared. Moreover, the project with more impact on the difference from one SB to another is 
identified. In the following graph, in which the x-axis has the SBs and the y-axis has the PV of 
the costs for the public partner (M€), the differences between SBs are observable: 
 
 
Figure 4: PV of the predicted costs in each SB 
X-axis: SBs 
Y-axis: PV of predicted gross costs for the State (M€) 
 
From the SB 2005 to 2008, PVs of the predicted costs on the road sector were relatively similar, 
with an average around 3 366 M€. The increase from SB 2007 to 2008 is mainly explained by 
the introduction of Túnel do Marão. From 2008 to 2009, there was a large increase. Actually, in 
2009, there were eight more projects with contracted costs for the State. They were the reason 
for this increase, in fact, without including these new projects (grey bar in the graph), the 
difference between SB 2008 and 2009 would be insignificant. From 2009 to 2010, there was 
also an increase, which may be linked to renegotiations and FRAs. Nevertheless, in 2011, it 
decreases. Contrarily to other SBs, this one explains the differences between this SB and the 
previous one. It says that the reduction of net costs is due to the introduction of real tolls in 
SCUTs and because the investment on the AE Centro was postponed (SB, 2011). SBs 2013 and 
2014 present lower predicted costs than the previous one. This may be linked to the attempt to 
reduce costs. In fact, in the SB 2013, it is said that the predicted reduction from 2012 to 2013 is 
related to renegotiations of concessions with the availability model. The concessions are the 




Beira Litoral Alta, Norte and Grande Lisboa. Several measures were applied in order to achieve 
that objective. One of them was the reduction of the internal rate of return to shareholders that 
was defined in the base-case (SB, 2013). The data that was provided by EP has an item in 2013 
called Reduction of Charges, thus, I may conclude that these renegotiations are included in this 
item. Actually, without including it, the PV of the road sector’s costs would increase by 5%. 
During December 2012, the process of renegotiation for reducing costs regarding several 
concessions, started. In the first quarter of 2013, seven memorandums of understanding and 
protocols were already signed, in order to achieve the objectives for 2013 (UTAP, 2013). From 
the SB 2013 to 2014, predicted costs increased. In fact, this is denoted in the SB 2014. It says 
that there are factors that the Government does not control that increase public costs. However, 
the Government still wants to conclude renegotiations to reduce some costs. Thus, there is still 
an item called Reduction of Charges. As far as I am concerned, in this item and in the SB 2014 
are included renegotiations with sub-concessions, concessions Algarve and Norte Litoral. These 
are the projects that are still waiting for agreements. As aforementioned, seven projects were 
renegotiated during 2013, namely Costa de Prata, Grande Porto, Beira Litoral e Alta, Norte, 
Grande Lisboa, Beira Interior and Interior Norte (UTAP, 2012). In addition to this, the 
Government also decided to start negotiations with regard to concessions Brisa and Lusoponte, 
in order to have additional savings (SB, 2014) 52.  
On a curious note, there are great challenges in 2014. This is the year that payments regarding 
sub concessions of the EP start being paid. Thus, renegotiation processes are already underway, 
in order to alleviate the costs for the public partner (SB, 2014).  
Below, I present the percentage changes from one SB to another. In addition to this, there is an 
analysis with regard to the projects that contributed most for the change in the road sector from 
one SB to another53. 
 
SB2006 SB2007 SB2008 SB2009 SB2010 SB2011 SB2012 SB2013 SB2014 
Roads 1% 6% 17% 130% 28% -7% 3% -20% 10% 
Table 11: Percentage change of the PV of the predicted total costs from one SB to another 
 
From 2005 to 2006, Beiras Litoral e Alta is the concession that contributes most to the 1% 
increase. Regarding the increase from the SB 2006 to 2007 in the road sector, the major 
contribution is from Norte Litoral (the contribution is 2%, the PV of this concession’s costs 
increases 17%). From 2007 to 2008, Túnel do Marão is the concession that contributes most for 
the 17% increase (the contribution is 9%). This project was launched in 2007, so the SB of 2008 
                                                     





is the first one to include it. From 2008 to 2009, AE Centro and Pinhal Interior are the 
concessions that contribute most to the increase of 130% (contributions are 35% and 29% 
respectively). The launch of these projects was in 2008. Therefore, they were included in the SB 
2009. There were other projects that were launched at the time, but these presented lower 
predicted costs. From 2009 to 2010, the highest contribution for the 28% increase is from the 
concession Norte (the contribution is 14%). In fact, the SB 2010 was the first one after the 
renegotiation of this concession. This was when it changed from a project with no costs for the 
public partner to a project with availability payments from the public to the private partner. 
From 2010 to 2011, the AE Centro is the one that contributes most to the 7% decrease (the 
predictions decreases 100%). In fact, the project was postponed, and it was not included in the 
SB 2011. From 2011 to 2012, the concession that contributed most to the increase of 3% is 
Litoral Oeste (the contribution is 2%). The predicted costs of Litoral Oeste increases by 26%. 
From 2012 to 2013, the reduction (-20%) is chiefly explained by the item called Reduction of 
Charges. Finally, from 2013 to 2014, the increase (10%) is explained by the increase of the item 
Reduction of Charges (its contribution is 27%). This item includes all expected renegotiations, 
but some of them were already determined. Thus, the impact of these renegotiations is allocated 
to each of them in the SB 2014, and not included in the item Reduction of Charges.  
 
4.3 Analysis of the econometric model 
As aforementioned, this analysis is based on a cross-sectional time series data model. The 
database consists of information on the several PPP projects since 2005 until 2014, retrieved 
from the annual SBs. The model is presented below (individual-specific effects model), and has 
as dependent variable the logarithm of the PV of the predicted costs with regard to each project 
in each SB: 
 
Yit=αi + β1ln(CAPEXi) + β2 ln(Kilometresi) + β3 (Risk allocationi) + β4 (SCUTs modelit) + β5 
(availability payments modelit) + β6 (model with payments for availability and servicei) + β7 




εit  is i.i.d. over i and t 
i= 1,…, 24, which corresponds to the following projects:  
Oeste, Algarve, Beira Interior, Interior Norte, Costa de Prata, Grande Porto, Norte Litoral, 




Transmontana, Douro Interior, Túnel do Marão, Baixo Alentejo, Baixo Tejo, Litoral Oeste, 
Algarve Litoral, Pinhal Interior, AE Centro and A21/Rota Oeste 
t= 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014 (corresponding to each SB) 
 




ln PV of costs Coefficient ln PV of costs Coefficient 




SCUTs model 5,64*** 
(0,33) 















SCUTs model 5,80***  
(0,30) 
Time invariant variables are included in the intercept 
*** p<1%, ** p<5%,* p<10%; std errors in parenthesis 




availability payments model 5,95***  
(0,28) 
  





North -0,45  
(0,51) 
 














*** p<1%, ** p<5%,* p<10%; std errors in parenthesis 
N=194; R2= 0,93; Wald chi2(12)= 842,57; Prob>chi2=0 
 
As observable in the results, the model with fixed effects includes time invariant variables in the 
intercept. They are related to the characteristics of the projects that usually do not change over 
time, namely CAPEX, Kilometres, Risk allocation, model with payments for availability and 
service54, North, Centre, Lisbon and More than a region. Nevertheless, the choice between fixed 
or random effects should not be based on the fact that I would want to include time invariant 
variables. The suitable option between fixed and random effects is identified by running the 
                                                     
54 Projects with payments for availability and service, contrarily to other projects, had always the same model. 




Hausman test. This tests if the predicted coefficients from both options are equal (H0). This 
analysis is relevant, since if there are random effects both estimators (random and fixed) are 
consistent, but the fe estimator is inefficient and the re estimator is efficient. Contrarily, if there 
are fixed effects, using the re estimator, I get inconsistent estimates, in other words, biased 
estimates. Otherwise, I get consistency with fe estimators. In conclusion, if the p-value is 
insignificant (Prob>chi2 higher than 5%), I should use random effects. Otherwise, I should use 
fixed effects. With the Hausman test, I concluded that I should apply random effects, since the 
p-value is 64% (> 5%). Therefore, the results are the following:  





Risk allocation -0,004  
(0,05)
GDP growth -0,13** 
(0,06)
SCUTs model 5,80*** 
(0,74)
availability payments model 5,95*** 
(0,79) 
model with payments for availability and service 5,80*** 
(0,44) 
North -0,45  
(0,32)











robust std. errors in parenthesis  
*** p<1%, ** p<5%,* p<10% 







Globally, this model explains 93% of the dependent variable. With the results of the model, I 
can note that the economic and political environment of the country has an impact on the 
predictions regarding how much the public partner will spend with PPPs of the road sector. 
When the GDP growth decreases, the PV of the predicted costs increases. As already 
mentioned, probably, it is easier for a government to invest through a PPP model than a TIP 
model during difficult economic scenarios, because the investment can be off budget. Over the 
SBs, when the predicted GDP growth decreases by one percentage point, the PV of the costs 
increases by 0,13%. In addition to this, it is verified that the SBs discussed during the years that 
Portugal was under the Financial Assistance Programme, SB 2012, 2013 and 2014, present 
lower predicted costs than the previous ones. This represents the renegotiations of the last years, 
which aim in reducing the costs of the public partner. Other type of renegotiations is represented 
by the variables related to the model of payment. Actually, these variables are statistically 
significant, and I can conclude that comparing to the traditional model with real tolls, the others 
models have, on average, higher costs. But, more important than this conclusion, I can also 
analyse the impact of the renegotiations, which change specific projects from one model of 
payment to another, on the predicted costs. Some projects changed from models with shadow 
tolls (SCUTs) to the model of payments for availability. And, on average, this change leads to 
an increase of the predicted costs. They increase, on average, by 16%, ceteris paribus. For 
example, Beira Interior is one of the projects that changed from SCUT to the availability model. 
With regard to the results of the model, I can analyse the predicted costs for this project before 
and after its renegotiation, taking into account that other variables are constant. According to the 
results of the model, the PV of the predicted costs of Beira Interior before the renegotiation is 
around 796 M€, and after the renegotiation is 925 M€.  
 
Ln (PV of the costs)=-3,25+0,91 × ln(CAPEX) - 0,27 × ln(Kilometres) - 0,004 × (Risk 
allocation) + 5,80 × (SCUTs model)+ 5,95 × (availability payments model)+ 5,80 × (model with 
payments for availability and service) -0,45 × (North) -0,15 × (Centre)+ 0,57 × (Lisbon) -1,02 × 
(More than a region) -0,23 × (Troika) -0,13 × (GDP growth) 
 
 Beira Interior before renegotiation:  
Ln (PV of the costs)=-3,25+0,91 × ln(628) - 0,27 × ln(178) - 0,004 × (39,5) + 5,80 × (1)+ 5,95 × 
(0)+ 5,80 × (0) -0,45 × (0) -0,15 × (1)+ 0,57 × (0) -1,02 × (0) -0,23 × (0) -0,13 × (0,2)=6,68 






 Beira Interior after renegotiation:  
Ln (PV of the costs)=-3,25+0,91 × ln(628) - 0,27 × ln(178) - 0,004 × (39,5) + 5,80 × (0)+ 5,95 × 
(1)+ 5,80 × (0) -0,45 × (0) -0,15 × (1)+ 0,57 × (0) -1,02 × (0) -0,23 × (0) -0,13 × (0,2)= 6,83 
PV of the costs= e6,83= 925 
 
Thus, the difference is 129 M€, the predicted costs increase by 16%. 
In addition to this, the concessions Norte and Grande Lisboa changed from traditional 
concessions to the model of availability payments. According to the result of the model, this 
renegotiation also increases, on average, the predicted costs. For example, according to the 
results of the model, the PV of the predicted costs of Norte before the renegotiation is 2,44 M€, 
and after the renegotiation is 935 M€, ceteris paribus.  
 
 Norte before renegotiation:  
Ln (PV of the costs)=-3,25+0,91 × ln(879) - 0,27 × ln(175) - 0,004 × (39,5) + 5,80 × (0)+ 5,95 × 
(0)+ 5,80 × (0) -0,45 × (1) -0,15 × (0)+ 0,57 × (0) -1,02 × (0) -0,23 × (0) -0,13 × (0,2)=0,89 
PV of the costs= e0,89= 2,435129651 
 Norte after renegotiation:  
Ln (PV of the costs)=-3,25+0,91 × ln(879) - 0,27 × ln(175) - 0,004 × (39,5) + 5,80 × (0)+ 5,95 × 
(1)+ 5,80 × (0) -0,45 × (1) -0,15 × (0)+ 0,57 × (0) -1,02 × (0) -0,23 × (0) -0,13 × (0,2)= 6,84 
PV of the costs= e6,84= 934,4891347 
Thus, with this change on the model of payment, the predicted costs increase by 38275%, on 
average, ceteris paribus. 
Therefore, I can conclude that, on average, these types of renegotiations increase the predicted 
costs. 
Regarding the control variables, only CAPEX is statistically significant55. Actually, projects 
with a higher CAPEX have, as expected, higher costs for the public partner. On average, when 
the CAPEX increases 1%, the PV of the costs increases by 0,91%. 
 
Summarily, the predictions presented in the SBs are affected by the economic context of the 
country and by renegotiations of the contracts. In this econometric analysis, renegotiations 
include the ones that are related to the change of the model of payment and to the renegotiations 
stipulated in the Memorandum of the Troika. 
                                                     
55 Regarding the variable kilometres I thought that the result (the fact that is not statistically significant) was due to an outlier: the 
project Brisa. Brisa is the project with more kilometres but during the analysed period it has no predicted costs for the public 





It is unquestionable that the PPP model has been a way to stimulate the public investment.  
Theoretically, this model can bring positive effects to the society as a whole. Due to the share of 
know-how and resources between the private and public partners, this can lead to the 
maximization of the collective satisfaction. However, countries still have several challenges to 
deal with, in order to achieve the benefits of this type of financing. 
In Portugal, several projects were undergone by PPPs, and it is one of the countries with 
greatest experience on the area. Over the years, the Portuguese State has been improving the 
way it deals with PPP projects. For instance, in the last two years it has been trying to reduce its 
burden. In addition to this, Portugal is considered an example regarding the information 
provided in the SBs, since they present the predicted net costs for each sector in a long-run 
perspective. 
However, as in many other countries, in Portugal there are still many aspects of this partnership 
that need to be improved. First of all, I have to emphasize the need for more transparency. The 
lack of information was one of the main limitations for the development of this dissertation. It is 
obvious that there are great differences regarding the predicted costs for the public partner for 
exactly the same period of time over State Budgets, but they do not clearly present their 
explanations. For instance, it is not obvious on which SB a certain renegotiation has impact and 
in which way it affects the predictions. In addition to this, there is several information about 
FRAs that is not disclosed, and that obviously affects the predictions. Regarding this lack of 
transparency, a simple way to improve the information provided in the SBs would be to present 
the predictions not only by sector, but also for each project separately, like the data provided me 
by the Estradas de Portugal, S.A. They should also disclose the net and the gross costs. 
Furthermore, it would be important that the values in different SBs should be more readily 
comparable. Regarding this, the OECD (2002) suggested that a SB “should be reconciled with 
forecasts contained in earlier fiscal reports for the same period”. In addition to this, SBs should 
include information with regard not only to direct but also indirect costs of all partnerships for 
the public sector.  
Nevertheless, with the information publicly available, I was able to understand some of the 
reasons for different SBs presenting different predictions regarding the cost that the State will 
bear during 2014-2031. In this dissertation I had as objectives to assess which factors can affect 
the predictions and understand the reason why different SBs have different predictions. 
Therefore, I computed an econometric model that aimed to explain the PV of the predicted costs 
by project in each SB. According to the result, the predictions, regarding how much the State 




type of renegotiation). The model of payment is related to the fact that the PPP projects in the 
road sector can be included in different groups, according to the delivered service and payments 
to private partners. I concluded that projects that change from SCUTs or traditional concessions 
to the model of payments for availability, on average, increase their predicted costs. Moreover, 
the expected GDP growth has also an impact on the PV of the predicted costs. In periods with 
lower GDP growth the PV of the costs usually increases. This may be linked to the idea that 
governments apply the PPP model to push expenditures to the future, because investments can 
be off budget. Actually, this can be more tempting during periods of economic downturn. Thus, 
the predictions are also affected by the economic environment. In addition to this, they also are 
affected by the fact that Portugal was in the last years under a Financial Assistance Programme 
(which also had as consequence some renegotiations). I verified that on average the predicted 
costs are lower in the last years and this may be linked to the presence of Troika in Portugal. 
Summarily, the variables of the model that are statistically significant are, in fact, SCUTs model, 
availability payments model, model with payments for availability and service, GDP growth and 
Troika.  
In addition to this, through data analysis I was also able to understand some of the reasons why 
different SBs present different predictions. Summarily, I concluded that from the SB 2005 to 
2007 the predictions are relatively similar. However, from the SB 2007 to 2008 they increased. 
This is mainly explained by the introduction of a new project, Túnel do Marão. From SB 2008 
to 2009, there was a higher increase, which was due to the launch of the sub concessions of the 
EP. From SB 2009 to 2010, the increase was the consequence of some renegotiations. For 
example, the concession Norte until 2009 was a traditional concession with no costs for the 
State. In 2009 it was renegotiated and it became a project with payments for availability. 
Moreover, I also verified, as in the econometric analysis, that the decrease in the last two SBs 
(SB 2013 and 2014) reflects the efforts that the State is making to reduce its costs.  
To conclude, everyone can take some lessons out of the Portuguese experience with PPPs. I 
think that the decision-makers in Portugal are aware of the partnerships that went well and the 
ones that should be perfected. Hence, governments should take this opportunity to enhance their 
role in favour of the satisfaction of the collective needs and improve the management of public 
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1. TIP vs PPP 
 
Figure 5: TIP vs PPP 
Source: Posner, Ryu et Tkachenko, 2009  
 
In the graph above, the relations between the involved entities in the PPP model and in the TIP 
model are presented. In addition to this, there are other differences between these two models. 
Two of them are expenditure and revenue flows and the risk allocation. For instance, the capital 
expenditure of the government is usually lower and of the private entity is higher in the PPP 
model (OECD, 2008). With regard to current expenditures, in the PPP model, the government 
usually has mandatory costs every year during the lifetime of a contract. Contrarily, with TIP 
projects, the government usually has costs for O&M, but the amount can be decided each year 
(Posner, Ryu et Tkachenko, 2009). 












Figure 6: TIP vs PPP 














There are two complete different situations: the complete government production and delivery 
and the privatisation. In this last situation, the government is not involved in any phase and the 
private partner is the owner of the asset. Thus, the private entity can maximize its profits. In the 
TIP model, the government defines the quality, the quantity and the design of the service or 
good that buys directly from the private entity. Then, the government transfers directly or 
indirectly to citizens. The PPP model is in the middle of these extreme situations. The 
government also defines the quantity and the quality of the service or good, but the private 
entity can design it. Contrarily to TIP, the government does not buy it directly from the private 
entity. Actually, it buys the several services that the private entity can provide with the asset 
during a period of time. The private entity is responsible for this provision and for the O&M of 
the asset (OECD, 2008). In this model, there are different types. This depends on the role of the 
private partner. In other words, it depends on the responsibility that the private entity assumes. 
These types are: Build-own-maintain (BOM), Build-own-operate (BOO), Build-develop-operate 
(BDO), Design-construct-manage-finance (DCMF), Design-build-operate (DBO), Buy-build-
operate (BBO), Lease-own-operate (LOO), Build-operate-transfer (BOT), Build-own-operate-
transfer (BOOT), Build-rent-own-transfer (BROT), Build-lease-operate-transfer (BLOT) and 
Build-transfer-operate (BTO)  (Posner, Ryu et Tkachenko, 2009). 
 
2. Risks 
Risks related to PPPs are the following (Schwartz, Corbacho et Funke, 2008; Cardoso, 2011): 
 Construction risk: this includes problems with the design of the project, and also “cost 
and schedule overruns” 
 Financial risk: if the generated cash flows are not enough to repay loans and invested 
capital  
 Demand risk: if demand decreases and consequently the cash flow declines 
 Availability risk: “the possible lack of continuity and low quality of service provision”. 
For example, if an infrastructure is not available and/or it is not available as defined 
(with the characteristics that were defined in the contract) 
 Political risk: if the government takes a decision that affects negatively the potential 
revenues of the private partner. This can include the legislative risk, since the State is 
responsible for the legislation. If it publishes a law that affects the revenues/costs which 
were contractually defined. Moreover, this can also include the risk of unilateral 
changes by the public partner. 
 Force Majeure risk: risks that cannot be controlled by neither the public nor the private 




 Residual Value risk: “uncertainty regarding the market price of the infrastructure asset 
at the end of the contract period” 
 Environmental Assessment risk: An infrastructure is only built if there is an approval 
that declares that it does not have negative externalities for the environment 
 Expropriation risk: The responsible for this risk is who has to expropriate the land in 
order to build an infrastructure. If this entity cannot do it during the defined period, 
which affects the construction phase (because the infrastructure is not ready to be 
operational at the defined date), it has to compensate the other partner (who may not 
receive cash flows during that period) 
 
3. Contingent liabilities 
A contingent liability is a potential liability, which is only converted as an actual liability and 
has impact on the budget if a certain event occurs (OECD, 2002; PPIAF, 2012). They are 
associated with some risks. For example, it is defined in a contract that if a force majeure event 
occurs, the public partner has to compensate the private partner. However, this is a cost that 
initially cannot be measured and it is impossible to know the timing. Contrarily, a direct liability 
does not depend on the occurrence of a future situation. It includes what I call normal costs, 
such as availability payments and shadow tolls. It is defined in the contract when they are paid 
(PPIAF, 2012).  
The OECD recommends the disclosure of the total amount related to contingent liabilities and 
division by categories that depend on their nature. In the situation that it is not feasible to 
present it in this way, contingent liabilities should be at least enumerated and described (OECD, 
2002). In addition to this, the PPIAF describes some ways to budget these liabilites. One 
possibility is to “create additional budget flexibility”, for example, by having a contingent line 
from which payments that are not expected can be made. Other possibility is to “create a 






































Figure 7: The process of renegotiation in Portugal 
Source: Cardoso, 2011 
 
5. Summary of the History of PPPs 
PPPs have emerged in the decade of 50 and 60 in the U.S.A. as joint ventures (Bult-Spiering et 
Dewulf, 2006). In Europe, the pioneer was the U.K. in the 90’s (Bult-Spiering et Dewulf, 2006; 
Posner, Ryu et Tkachenko, 2009; Moreno, 2010). The PPP model has been heavily applied 
since 1990: “In the 1800s, many railways were built under concessions that guaranteed private 
investors a minimum rate of return. In the 1960s and 1970s, concessions were used to finance 
investments in French and Spanish highways. But the use of PPPs increased in the 1990s and 
2000s, partly with the development in the United Kingdom of PPPs in which the government 
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was the main purchaser of the project’s services (in our terminology, government-funded 
PPPs)” (Funke, Irwin et Rial, 2013).  
 
6. Concession 
A concession is a PPP. However, there is a distinction between Pure PPP and Concession PPP. 
In the Pure PPP model, the private partner receives payments mainly from the public partner. In 
the Concession PPP model, typically, there are no regular costs for the government; the project 
is auto-sustainable. The main source of revenues of the private partner is payments from the 
users. Thus, revenues depend on the demand. In this context, the private partner bears most of 
risks (particularly, demand risk). The public partner is usually called the grantor, whereas, the 
private partner is called the concessionaire (OECD, 2008; Burger et Hawkesworth, 2011; 
Sarmento, 2013).  
 
7. Estradas de Portugal, S.A 
It is a public company. In 2007, it was defined, with the NMGFSR*, that the EP was the grantor 
of new projects in the road sector. Thus, the Government is no longer the direct public grantor 
of new contracts with private partners. Regarding, the pre-existing roads (before this decision) 
the State is still the direct grantor until the end of each contract. However, the EP includes in its 
budget the cost and the revenue of the State with those projects. 
Summarily, there are three entities and two contracts. The entities are public partners, the EP 
and the Government. There is a global contract (during 75 years) between the Government and 
the EP, and there are contracts between the EP and private partners. Therefore, since this 
decision, the EP has sub concessions and it is called the global concessionaire of the State. It 
became responsible for the conception, project, construction, financing, conservation, operation, 
requalification and enlargement of the national road network. However, it delegates some of 
these responsibilities on private partners (DGTF, 2009; Moreno, 2010; Estradas de Portugal, 
2012; Azevedo, 2013). 
*NMGFSR- Novo Modelo de Gestão e Financiamento do Sector Rodoviário 
The objective of this new model was to guarantee the auto sustainability of the road sector and 
reduce the cost for the Government. In addition to this, it aims at dividing the functions of 
operation and supervision, in order to increase efficiency and improve transparency. The first 
one is one of the responsibilities of the EP56. In this context, the aforementioned global contract 
                                                     




between the Government and the EP was signed. In this new model of management, new 
projects to be developed by the EP were identified. Thus, the tendering process regarding the 
following concessions was launched: Auto-estrada Transmontana and Douro Interior (RCM nº 
177/2007 de 10.12), Alto Alentejo, Baixo Alentejo, Baixo Tejo, Litoral Oeste, Auto-estrada do 
Centro (RCM nº 181/2007 de 11.12), Algarve Litoral (RCM nº 56/2008 de 26.03) and Pinhal 
Interior (RCM nº 106/2008 de 07.07) (Azevedo, 2013; Estradas de Portugal, 2012).  
 
8. Costs for the State with PPPs in the railway and health sectors 
8.1 Railway Sector 
There are three PPPs in the railway sector, which are the Eixo Norte-Sul, the Metro Sul do Tejo 
(MST) and the PPP1. 
In this sector, the gross costs from the State to private partners depend on the demand of the 
MST. The State has to compensate the private partner when the volume of traffic is less than 
what was contractually defined (Moreno, 2010; Ernst & Young, 2012). 
Moreover, the Eixo Norte-Sul had, theoretically, no costs for the State. However, in reality, it 
became a project highly subsidized by the State. This was due to the fact that the traffic risk was 
allocated to the public partner. The real traffic was lower than predicted, thus the State had to 
compensate the concessionaire. Therefore, the State decided to renegotiate the contract. The 
renegotiated payments for the private partner comprise compensations, user rates and payments 
for the provision of public services. Although it enabled the State to reduce its burden, it was 
not at a zero-cost. Nevertheless, this is considered an example of a good renegotiation, in the 
perspective of the State (Moreno, 2010). 
The PPP1 is the first PPP of the high-speed network in Portugal (DGTF, 2011). Regarding this 
PPP, its approval has been rejected by the NAO, so the Government cancelled the project. 
According to Ernst & Young, if the project is suspended, future costs for the State probably will 
be related to indemnities (Ernst & Young, 2012).  
8.2 Health Sector  
In the health sector there are eight PPP contracts in hospitals. PPPs in this sector are divided 
into two distinct groups, two waves: the first wave includes the hospitals Cascais, Braga, Vila 
Franca de Xira and Loures. The model of this wave is composed by two contracts. One for the 
clinical management (provision of health service), which the duration is 10 years, and another 
for the management of hospital building (the infrastructure), which the duration is 30 years. The 
second wave has a different model. This wave includes the Lisboa Oriental57 and Algarve 
hospitals, and there is only a contract regarding the management of the hospital building. In this 
                                                     




case, only the public sector is responsible for the management of the health care’s provision 
(DGTF, 2009; Moreno, 2010). 
In this sector, costs for the public partner are payments for the hospital production and 
additional protocols that are contracted by the National Health System (NHS). For hospital 
buildings, it pays availability payments with a fixed and a variable part (linked to inflation) 
(Ernst & Young, 2012). 
In addition to these, there are other two projects, Centro de Medicina Física e Reabilitação do 
Sul (CMFRS) and Centro de Atendimento do Serviço Nacional de Saúde (CASNS). For 
CMFRS, it pays for contracted clinic production for hospitalization and external appointments. 
And for CASNS, payments depend on the quantity of contracts (Ernst & Young, 2012). 
 
9. Contract of Costa de Prata after renegotiation 
CHAPTER XIII- Payments from the grantor 
Annual Payment from the public partner to the private partner is based on the following 
formula: 
 
Rt- Payment in year t 
Dist- Payment regarding availability in year t 
Dedt- deductions regarding non-availability in year t 
Sint- value that depends on the level of accidents in year t 
 
10. Contract of Transmontana 
CHAPTER XVIII- Payments from the grantor 




Rt- Payment in year t 
Dist- Payment regarding availability in year t 
Servt- Payment regarding the delivered service in year t 
Dedt- deductions regarding non-availability in year t 





11. Launch date of projects 
Projects Launch date Contract's date 
Brisa 1972 
Lusoponte 1992 1994 
Oeste 1997 1998 
Norte 1997 1999 
Beira Interior 1997 1999 
Costa de Prata 1998 2000 
Algarve 1998 2000 
Interior Norte 1998 2000 
Norte Litoral 1999 2001 
Beiras Litoral e Alta 1998 2001 
Grande Porto 1998 2002 
Litoral Centro 1999 2004 
Grande Lisboa 2003 2007 
Douro Litoral 2004 2007 
Túnel do Marão 2007 2008 
Transmontana 2007 2008 
Douro Interior 2007 2008 
Baixo Tejo 2007 2009 
Baixo Alentejo 2007 2009 
Litoral Oeste 2008 2009 
Algarve Litoral 2008 2009 
Pinhal Interior 2008 2010 
Table12: Launch date of projects 
Source: EP (2011) 
12. Costs for the public partner with PPP projects in the road sector 
 
Figure 8: PV of the predicted costs for the State per SBs 
X-axis: SBs 






Figure 9: PV of the predicted costs for the State per SBs 
X-axis: SBs 
Y-axis: PV of predicted costs for the State (M€) 
 
 
Figure 10: PV of the predicted costs for the State per SBs 
X-axis: SBs 






Figure 11: PV of the predicted costs for the State per SBs 
X-axis: SBs 





Figure 12: PV of the predicted costs for the State per SBs 
X-axis: SBs 






Figure 13: PV of the predicted costs for the State per SBs 
X-axis: SBs 
Y-axis: PV of predicted costs for the State (M€) 
 
 
Figure 14: PV of the predicted costs for the State per SBs 
X-axis: SBs 






Figure 15: PV of the predicted costs for the State per SBs 
X-axis: SBs 
Y-axis: PV of predicted costs for the State (M€) 
 
 
Figure 16: PV of the predicted costs for the State per SBs 
X-axis: SBs 






Figure 17: PV of the predicted costs for the State per SBs 
X-axis: SBs 
Y-axis: PV of predicted costs for the State (M€) 
 
 
Figure 18: PV of the predicted costs for the State per SBs 
X-axis: SBs 






Figure 19: PV of the predicted costs for the State per SBs 
X-axis: SBs 
Y-axis: PV of predicted costs for the State (M€) 
 
 
Figure 20: PV of the predicted costs for the State per SBs 
X-axis: SBs 






Figure 21: PV of the predicted costs for the State per SBs 
X-axis: SBs 
Y-axis: PV of predicted costs for the State (M€) 
 
 
Figure 22: PV of the predicted costs for the State per SBs 
X-axis: SBs 






Figure 23: PV of the predicted costs for the State per SBs 
X-axis: SBs 
Y-axis: PV of predicted costs for the State (M€) 
 
 
Figure 24: PV of the predicted costs for the State per SBs 
X-axis: SBs 






Figure 25: PV of the predicted costs for the State per SBs 
X-axis: SBs 
Y-axis: PV of predicted costs for the State (M€) 
 
 
Figure 26: PV of the predicted costs for the State per SBs 
X-axis: SBs 






Figure 27: PV of the predicted costs for the State per SBs 
X-axis: SBs 
Y-axis: PV of predicted costs for the State (M€) 
 
 
Figure 28: PV of the predicted costs for the State per SBs 
X-axis: SBs 






Figure 29: PV of the predicted costs for the State per SBs 
X-axis: SBs 
Y-axis: PV of predicted costs for the State (M€) 
 
 
Figure 30: PV of the predicted costs for the State per SBs 
X-axis: SBs 
Y-axis: PV of predicted costs for the State (M€) 
 
 
 
